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Strategy is a problematic yet often-invoked concept. This thesis explores the  
2015 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), philosophy, and social theory to develop an 
alternative framework for the formulation of strategy in the security domain. The 2015 
NSS is analyzed for consistency in its concepts and categories. A model of strategic 
agency is proposed as an alternative framework for developing security strategy. The 
strategic agency model draws upon actor-network theory and utilizes a novel approach 
whereby ontology is conceived as a network of power relations. Strategic agency 
provides a mechanism whereby a perceiving self-observer (Strategos, the strategic agent) 
may identify, describe, and explain the behavior of other actors in the strategic 
environment. This thesis relates how the perspective of Strategos moves along a 
continuum of ontology and epistemology in framing its world, with implications for 
accurate modeling of social systems. A model for analytical use in strategy development 
is presented along with insights into how such a model might be employed for analytical, 
planning, and operational purposes. 
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A paramount value, such as survival versus extinction, cannot be cost 
estimated. 
—Folke Dovring, Knowledge and Ignorance:  
Essays on Lights and Shadows 
 
A. PREFACE  
The turn to irregular warfare and counterterrorism in the late 20th and early 21st 
centuries has presented policy-makers and security and defense professionals with a new 
and challenging dynamic environment. How do strategies of intimidation and death 
emerge from those who would say they are fighting for their lives and livelihoods? If 
preventing death is our metric of success, then we are destined to fail. We must ask 
ourselves instead what it means to be alive, and what drives man to violence and to 
expend his life and the lives of others.  
The raison d’être of strategy is neither to know nor conquer the world, but to 
survive it. To survive, each of us needs to know how to achieve our goals and to 
understand how and why other actors would want to achieve goals different from our 
own. The goal of this thesis is to present a new and simplified model for constructing 
security strategy. The new model enables a novel understanding of what “strategy” is and 
how it functions as a representation of the real world.  
Within the context of broader policy efforts, the U.S. National Security Strategy 
(NSS) provides a baseline and reference point for U.S. engagement and policy decisions 
both at home and abroad. It is useful for policy-makers and analysts to understand 
precisely how the NSS understands the United States and the other actors it must engage 
with, namely other states, international institutions, and non-state actors. Rather than 
offer opinions on what particular effects a U.S. national security strategy should seek to 
achieve, this thesis addresses a more fundamental question: “What should constitute a 
framework for the formulation of national security strategy?”  
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B. RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
(1) Method 
This thesis comprises three distinct but integrated phases of research: 
• Phase 1: An analysis of how the 2015 NSS portrays the United States and 
the other actors and threats with which the U.S. must interact; and, 
development of a set of requirements for an “ideal” strategy. 
• Phase 2: A study of social theory and philosophy pertinent to the 
construction of a strategy that accurately models how we know and 
understand reality. 
• Phase 3: Development of a synthetic model for formulating security 
strategy, followed by discussion of how such a model might be applied. 
 
(2) Phase 1 – Analysis of the 2015 NSS 
A strategy presents not only goals and objectives but also their underlying 
rationale. While a strategy may be a document, it also symbolically represents the logic 
and thinking of its creators. A study of the 2015 NSS reveals that it: 
• Vaguely and inconsistently identifies the United States, its adversaries, 
and the threats faced by the U.S. 
• Variously portrays the United States as a nation by itself, as a nation 
acting in concert with allies, as an imaginary of “American values,” in 
ways that are often in conflict throughout the NSS. 
• Presents the U.S. and its allies aligned against other states, international 
institutions, and non-state actors, without clearly defining the relationships 
between them. 
The 2015 NSS attempts to position the United States on the world stage. The NSS 
does not, however, provide a consistent logic to explain how the world works, and it 
provides only a rudimentary description of what constitutes “acceptable behavior” for 
other states. The NSS attempts to set limits on U.S. engagement in the world, but does 
not clearly define what those limits are; as a result, the goals and objectives of the NSS 
are presented in terms of cost-benefit. Also, the threats listed in the NSS are assumed to 
also be threats to the international system of states within which the U.S. seeks to 
maintain a relative advantage. 
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The world of the early 21st century is complex and dynamic. The 2015 NSS falls 
short because it is closely tied to an understanding of international relations that naïvely 
privileges the role of the state. It also suffers from a crippling oversimplification by 
positioning the United States in a direct, binary opposition to threats that prevents an 
accurate portrayal of the real world’s true complexity. The NSS struggles to deal with 
issues like international terrorism because it does not provide a way to understand how 
the actions of an individual may directly affect the actions of a state.  
An ideal National Security Strategy would engage this dynamic reality in a way 
that allows the strategy to be modeled, set into motion, and described in detail. The first 
requirement for an ideal strategy is an underlying framework of what the world consists 
of: an ontology. Second, an ideal strategy would provide some means for explaining and 
animating the actions and behavior of the states, non-state actors, and other entities in its 
world. And, third, an ideal strategy should facilitate nuanced analysis and description 
without being tied to the frames of specific theories, such as the schools of realism and 
institutionalism in international relations. 
(3) Phase 2 – Articulation of Theory 
The complexity of the real world implies that multiple observers (actors) each see 
the world differently. Accounting for such a plurality of beliefs allows a strategy to 
approach reality on a common footing with its adversaries, even though each perceives 
reality in different ways. Likewise, each observer holds its own biases and views how the 
world should function; conflict emerges when different systems of belief about how the 
world should be structured compete with each other. These conflicts may be understood 
as a byproduct of interference in the normative power structures that give agency to each 
actor. Rather than working to detail how various social power structures are different and 
unique, it is more productive to understand them in terms of what they have in common, 
which is an underlying network of power relations: an actor-network. 
Using this approach, it is possible to construct a model in which actors make 
decisions based on seeking to maintain a relative advantage within their own power 
networks; and, therefore, that the decision-making ability of actors is limited by the 
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options they perceive within those networks. Actors will seek to maintain relative power 
within their actor-networks against the backdrop of all contemplated futures, ideals, 
beliefs and historical narratives, social relations, and physical and environmental tools 
and resources; thus, each actor is motivated to maintain strategic agency within its own 
perception of the underlying power network. 
Theorizing a strategy as a representation of reality thus enables us to imagine an 
“actor” at the center of a strategy, which this thesis refers to as Strategos. Just like other 
actors (states, non-state actors, etc.) in a strategy, Strategos will seek to maintain strategic 
agency in the broader environment. This allows the question of strategy to be answered in 
an indirect way: by first articulating a nuanced understanding of the environment which 
the strategy seeks to engage, the field of possible actions of Strategos may be known. 
Equipped with this information, a strategist may then proceed to develop courses of 
action appropriate to desired goals and limitations. 
(4) Phase 3 – The Synthetic Model of Strategy Formulation 
The complex reality modeled in a strategy will be seen by Strategos as more or 
less complex; that is, more or less along the lines of reductionism or pluralism. A more 
complex model will more closely represent reality; in contrast, a more reductionist model 
will necessarily involve sacrifices in detail when speaking to the identity and motivations 
of other actors. In each case, though, the strategy is understood to be a reflection of 
reality: the level of complexity and detail are variable depending upon the needs of the 
strategy and the analyst constructing it. 
A broad range of different concepts and ideas may be considered actors within the 
power network; these may include both human and non-human entities, such as 
individual people, nation-states, ideas, and cultural-religious narratives. In this model, 
each actor perceives other actors in terms of how they may be leveraged within the 
context of the perceiving actor’s particular power network. Moreover, each actor only 






A national security strategy presents a worldview; and, in many ways, it is a 
theoretical model of how the world “works.” In any theoretical model, consistency and 
integrity of themes and concepts throughout the model are imperative if the model is to 
be useful. As such, this project adapts existing ideas and models to speak in terms of the 
underlying power relations between actors, specifically those of thinking human actors 
within complex social systems.  
The central task for a strategist is to understand how to interact with others and 
achieve desired outcomes. Likewise, a central problem of strategy emerges when one 
considers that both the strategist and the “other” with whom she interacts are intelligent 
agents. Imagining these actors as fundamentally distinct entities is convenient; but, this 
mode of thinking may inadvertently eliminate some strategic options. In contrast, a 
perspective that acknowledges the intricate relations between actors is especially useful 
when one considers that a national security strategy must provide a framework for 
engaging intelligent actors that perceive, interact with, and adapt to other actors.  
The strategy formulation framework developed in this project relies upon a 
relational understanding of reality—that is, how distinct actors are fundamentally and 
intrinsically related to each other in strategically significant ways. Two key concepts are 
introduced to allow better analysis of the strategic world: 
• The concept of Strategos, an active agent which engages with the strategic
world in which it is situated while simultaneously defining, from its own
perspective, what that world consists of and how it functions; and,
• The concept of strategic agency, which bounds and describes the possible
field of action of an actor as a function of its power relationships with other
actors.
As these two concepts have implications in analysis and the development of 
strategy, the following six maxims have been distilled to describe how the strategic 
agency framework may be best applied: 
(1) You only perceive what you can leverage. For all practical purposes, 
nothing else exists. 
 xx 
(2) Everything you perceive in the world empowers you. Terms, concepts, 
narratives, and categories are important.  
(3) You are defined by what empowers you, by the things you can leverage 
and react against. You are defined as much by your fears as by your goals. 
Your perception of your place in the world defines how you will interpret 
novelty; change is fluid, not abrupt, and “new” things will always be 
interpreted in context of prior things. 
(4) Contraversion is important. It is impossible to define victory without 
defining defeat. Pay attention to both, and take care to articulate the 
important but often-unspoken things. 
(5) Hierarchies and categories are merely descriptive frames superimposed 
atop an underlying network. In every case, categories and groupings move 
the analysis toward reductionism and away from the zenith of complexity 
which most closely correlates with the likely behavior of the network in 
reality. 
(6) Things which empower multiple actors are likely to be contested. Special 
focus on an accurate and nuanced understanding of how identity and 
meaning of these contested actors is translated across the network is 
crucial. Don’t focus on dominating a narrative. Focus instead on how 
various interpretations of a narrative empower those who contest it. 
The positions presented in this thesis provide a solid theoretical basis supporting 
the adage that “context is king.” Truth depends on each actor’s subjective interpretation 
of reality: perception is reality, and truth is a theory.1 Multiple truths, however, are 
perceived in any given reality. It is crucial, then, to note that strategy, as an undertaking, 
differs in fundamental ways from the positivism of normative scientific inquiry: strategy 
should not be about making truth-claims about “how things are,” but, rather, about 
engaging a world of competing claims to that effect. Strategy is, in its very essence, a 
creative undertaking; what evidence proves to one observer must always be taken in 
context of what another observer believes, as each position is valid in its own way. 
If a group, a government, or a nation state can be said to interact with its 
environment, then we must account for how each perceives its environment. Likewise, if 
an entity can be said to exist within an environment, then we must account for its integral 
                                                 
1 Janos Boros, “Truth in Philosophy after Rorty and Dewey,” Pragmatism Today 3, no. 1 (2012): 169. 
 xxi 
role as a constituent of that environment. Each actor in a strategy which perceives other 
actors (i.e., each Strategos) enjoys its own truths within a shared reality. The ability to 
separate these two related concepts is crucial for strategy development and analysis. On 
the one hand, everything within the strategic reality is part of a common matrix; on the 
other hand, each entity within that matrix can only know the world through the window 
of its own perceptions. 
The underlying structure within the strategic environment is a relational network. 
Within that network, power is constitutive: anything an actor can discretely discern and 
interact with is something that the actor can leverage and which mutually (i.e., 
discursively) defines the identity of the perceiving actor. This relationship is, in essence, 
a relationship of power. The dexterity with which Strategos can creatively rearrange, 
articulate, and leverage other actors in relation to each other and to Strategos determines 
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And we impart this in words not taught by human wisdom but taught by 
the Spirit, interpreting spiritual truths to those who are spiritual. 
— I Corinthians 2:13, ESV 
 
A. THE PROBLEM OF STRATEGY 
When Paul wrote his first epistle to the Corinthians, he was writing to a 
discordant congregation. The church at Corinth was dividing into factions and debates on 
doctrine were being conflated with different individuals and traditions. The meanings and 
observances of faith were contested. Paul wrote to remind the faithful that they were all 
of one tradition, that that tradition was not one of base humanity, and that they should not 
look to themselves or to other men for wisdom or salvation, but to God instead. He 
reminded the Corinthians that, while they may, in a manner of speaking, be considered 
“wise” in the “secret and hidden wisdom of God,” they held no claim to worldly wisdom. 
Spiritual matters being, by definition, not “of the world,” there were no grounds for 
worldly argument among themselves about spiritual matters.2 Rather, his assertion was 
simple: one can only understand and speak of spiritual things from within the frame of 
reference of the Spirit itself. The paradox with which Paul wrestles in 1 Corinthians is 
that our observance and existence in the world surrounding us belies its true nature: 
things are not what they appear to be. Paul reminded the Corinthians that an 
understanding of the spiritual machinery animating the world was accessible only 
through the Spirit itself, and further that no worldly debate or authority regarding that 
machinery could be had. 
Employment of the term “strategy” in the fields of national and homeland security 
is common today across a diverse set of domains; civil rights, intelligence, foreign policy, 
and defense are a few examples. The debates surrounding U.S. military and development 
actions abroad, coalescence of international coalitions to counter terrorism, and 
                                                 
2 1 Cor. 2:7, ESV 
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reorganizations of federal government in the homeland security and intelligence reforms 
post-9/11 are testament that, like Paul’s Corinthians, the contemporary American policy 
debate is discordant about why certain things occur, about what goals should be pursued, 
and about how those goals should be achieved. But, as Paul reminded the Corinthians, we 
must not become ensnared by attractive and yet empty debates about which assessment of 
events or promise of success most closely comports with the unique realities which each 
of us individually occupies. Instead of action-and-reaction—cause-and-effect—we must 
pursue a deeper, more fundamental, and, ultimately, more strategic understanding of our 
world. To speak of strategy is to speak of what is really going on: the hidden machinery 
that, once seen, cannot be unseen. 
A bureaucracy generates its own vernacular.3 To understand it, one must be 
initiated to it. In security circles, jargon is employed almost as a commodity; and, in 
discussions of the United States’ future in the world, one term is preeminent: strategy. 
“Strategy” is a signifier with diverse, complex, and debated meaning—which is, in itself, 
striking, given the term’s widespread use. Depending on how the word is used, by whom, 
and to which audience, “strategy” may be taken to mean a policy, an approach, or a 
purpose. It can represent a political agenda, a communicative action to “others,” and a 
presentation of shared vision around which organizational efforts might coalesce. It may 
also embody social values, provide a means to frame a discourse, and facilitate the 
maneuvering of issues in the public policy decision space—all at the same time.  
The national security imperative for a strategic understanding of the world is 
evident. The 2014 National Intelligence Strategy observes that non-state and 
transnational groups “can form, advocate, and achieve goals—for political, social, and 
economic change—all without central leadership,” and that “Identifying, understanding, 
and evaluating such movements will be both a continuing challenge and an opportunity 
for the IC [intelligence community].”4 Just as the IC works to “understand” and 
                                                 
3 Kimberley Christine Garwood, “Plain, but Not Simple: Plain Language Research with Readers, 
Writers, and Texts” (University of Waterloo, 2014), 32, https://uwspace.uwaterloo.ca/handle/10012/8401. 
4 James Clapper, “The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America” (Washington, 
DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), 5. 
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“evaluate” this landscape of “leaderless movement,” other elements of the United States 
government work to interact with that complex and complicated landscape through their 
efforts to combat terrorism, export democracy, manage economic development, and, 
more generally, to realize “opportunity” in the world for achieving goals articulated by 
U.S. leadership. 
The fundamental question of strategy is how best to interact within a system of 
perceived realities to maximize desired outcomes while also accounting for the 
independent agency of other actors within that system. There is no single, overarching 
method of analysis or framework of theory that lends itself to the broad spectrum of 
geopolitical questions that are raised in an industrialized, resource-constrained, and 
globalized social environment experiencing terrorism. What then, exactly, is being fought 
against (and for) in the so-called Global War on Terror (GWOT)? Who are the 
interactants, and what are the goals being sought? Is it a war declared upon evil incarnate, 
against an idea, to eliminate a group, or to oppress a culture, or a campaign of freedom 
and self-preservation? A framework for the formulation of security strategy must 
necessarily be of utility for analysts working across various domains—especially 
international relations, security studies, and political science—while also being easily 
translated to policy-makers, military and intelligence operators, and laymen of the 
broadest possible range of political, religious, and ideological tendencies. The hidden 
machinery of strategy should be readily understood, not esoteric. 
How the strategist tends to answer questions about contemporary conflicts and 
goals, like those set forth above, will vary according to how she conceptualizes the 
individual and his role in the world alongside organizations, states, and amorphous 
movements. More than merely categorical and descriptive knowledge of the world, it is 
her analytical ontology of the strategic environment—her understanding of its parts, how 
they are integrated, and how they interact—that will inform her answers. The use of the 
word “ontology” here is deliberate: it implies an underlying model—a universal lens—
for understanding behavior. While caveats and special cases may, of course, be applied 
when needed, these are nonetheless built upon the same foundation—viewed through the 
same ultimate lens—of “how the world works.” 
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B. RESEARCH GOALS 
This thesis explores current national security strategy and social theory in an 
attempt to approach a more strategic understanding of the world. It articulates a 
framework for developing strategy which may be broadly applicable within the security 
domain. It is an ontology of power: an abstract model for the behavior of man, that, when 
coupled with nuanced understanding of actors and their contexts, seeks to accommodate 
the divergent and conflicting goals and interests of nation-states, sub-state actors, and the 
individual which often complicate the generation of coherent analysis and the 
achievement of purposeful goals. 
The social represents a complex system that behaves in sometimes unexpected 
ways. The best way for security strategists to mentally model that system—i.e., an 
underlying ontology for security strategy that accounts for the role of identity, actor 
choice, and agency across a continuum from the individual to the international—has thus 
far remained unclear. To begin addressing this gap, we must first determine how the 
United States, in strategy, understands the world it exists within. This requires engaging 
in a dialogue with the United States’ current strategy as well as identifying the gaps 
between what that strategy evidently understands and the other areas where its 
understanding of the world is less clear or, perhaps, patently void. As these gaps of 
understanding are identified, we may then turn to theory for insight on how best to flesh 
out our understanding of the world and more firmly establish a foundation for 
formulating strategy. 
This thesis presents a new and simplified model to facilitate the analysis, 
development, and implementation of strategy in the security domain where an actor must 
interact with another actor or a system of actors toward some desired end. Specifically, 
the goal of this thesis is to derive and present a synthetic model—a derived framework 
with certain concepts and propositions—that animates the systematic interplay of power, 
behavior, and identity in strategy. Utilization of the synthetic framework will enable a 
fundamental redefinition of how strategy is understood and developed. Additionally, the 
synthetic model presented here may enable the development of more “resilient” strategy 
that better accounts for second-order effects; in other words, the goal is to present a 
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framework for strategy formulation that is useful, novel, and which may minimize “blow-
back” and unanticipated consequences sometimes caused by ill-formulated strategy. 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
1. Research Question 
In today’s complex security environment, offering critical perspectives on the 
content, stated aims, or actual outcomes of a particular strategy or set of strategies, and 
especially the retrospective analysis thereof, has become a diagnostic enterprise among 
both academicians and laymen. The question of practical improvement, however, remains 
in that the United States must continually adapt to changing circumstances in order to 
facilitate interaction with its environment and to achieve national ends. Conventional 
thinking conceptualizes movements, non-state actors, transnational groups, states, and 
multinational institutions in fundamentally different ways through the employment of 
multiple analytical paradigms, formal and informal. Colloquially, it is accurate to say that 
different tools are being used for the same (or, at least, closely related) jobs, to varying 
effect. Some of these analytical models may be mutually exclusive in their implications. 
Rectifying the apparent debilitation of strategy that results from such analytical 
incongruity would facilitate a more integrated formulation of strategy. Thus, this thesis 
asks, “What should constitute a framework for the formulation of national security 
strategy?” 
2. Methodology 
This study begins by engaging national security strategy as officially inscribed by 
the United States government. For this study, the National Security Strategy (NSS) 
submitted in February 2015 provides grounding for understanding how the United States 
formulates strategy in the nation’s current environment. The NSS, “together with 
decision-making, planning and execution, budgeting, and congressional oversight,” 
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comprises “a critical component of U.S. government thinking and practice in the arena of 
national security.”5  
This thesis utilizes the constant comparative method to analyze and synthesize 
across several themes. The constant comparative method, frequently implemented within 
grounded theory, involves an ongoing, continuous coding of data and comparison among 
and between coded categories and sources.6 In this way, data are interrogated to generate 
thought about their meaning, interpretation, and structure as “the researcher continually 
sorts through the data collection, analyzes and codes the information, and reinforces 
theory generation through the process of theoretical sampling.”7 The goal of the constant 
comparative method is to generate theory. Categories are interrogated as to their nature, 
temporal and spatial occurrence, causality, interaction with the data, and consequences.8  
This thesis is developed in three phases utilizing a running constant comparative 
analysis. Two phases of constant comparison are separated by a literature study phase. 
First, the purported features of the NSS are analyzed to develop a derived theory of an 
“ideal” strategy. Next, selected social theory is analyzed to answer the requirements of 
the theoretical “ideal” strategy. These inform the development of a synthetic framework 
that accommodates findings and propositions from the process as a whole. The result of 
this process is presented as a set of propositions about what strategy represents and how it 
may best be formulated. These propositions are then illuminated through discussions of 
hypothetical applications in the national security sphere. 
                                                 
5 Catherine Dale, “National Security Strategy: Mandates, Execution to Date, and Issues for Congress” 
(CRS Report R43174) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/
oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA584684. 
6 Hennie Boeije, “A Purposeful Approach to the Constant Comparative Method in the Analysis of 
Qualitative Interviews,” Quality and Quantity 36, no. 4 (2002): 392. 
7 Sharon M. Kolb, “Grounded Theory and the Constant Comparative Method: Valid Research 
Strategies for Educators,” Journal of Emerging Trends in Educational Research and Policy Studies 3, no. 1 
(2012): 83. 
8 Sheila M. Fram, “The Constant Comparative Analysis Method Outside of Grounded Theory.,” 
Qualitative Report 18 (2013): 5. 
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a. Phase 1 
The overarching emphasis of this phase of research was to seek a determination of 
what purposes national security strategy in general, and the 2015 NSS specifically, 
purports to serve. The interrogation using the constant comparative method during this 
phase was driven by questions including:  
(1) What is strategy, generally? 
(2) How is strategy employed within the national security domain? 
(3) What is the context of the 2015 National Security Strategy? 
(4) What are the stated and observed limitations and challenges of the 
Strategy? 
(5) Who are the actors presented in the Strategy? 
(6) Is the Strategy internally consistent and coherent? 
(7) How are the actors presented in the Strategy positioned in juxtaposition to 
each other? 
(8) Does the Strategy provide a consistent model of causation and motivation 
throughout, or is it heterogeneous? 
Exposition and analysis of the above are presented in Chapter II. 
The constant comparative process was then continued toward the development of 
an ideal, abstract theory of national security strategy. The extent to which the 2015 
National Security Strategy was found to be internally inconsistent and incoherent aided 
the formulation of an ideal theory of strategy through the introduction of negation: an 
ideal strategy would, necessarily, be neither self-negating nor self-contradictory. Thus, 
the scope of the comparatively-derived theory was broadened beyond the source material 
in order to determine more precisely what role a national security strategy should seek to 
fill. The interrogation using the constant comparative method during this phase was thus 




(1) Why is the Strategy necessary? 
(2) What are the structural characteristics of the world engaged by the 
Strategy? 
(3) How do logic, knowledge, and geopolitics limit the Strategy? 
(4) What should an ideal national security strategy consist of? 
An analysis based on the above line of questioning and the essential 
characteristics of an abstract, national security strategy are presented in Chapter III. 
b. Phase 2 
A literature study was conducted to identify and integrate social theory amenable 
to meeting the requirements—essential characteristics of an abstract strategy—put forth 
at the end of Phase 1. Selected theory provided the foundations and machinery necessary 
to animate the abstract ideal strategy. This process continued the analysis of what strategy 
purports to accomplish, actually accomplishes, and how it might be understood through 
various interpretations by an analyst. The dialectical literature study is presented in 
Chapter IV. 
c. Phase 3 
Based on the results of Phase 2, a synthetic model or framework for the 
formulation of national security strategy is proposed and set forth in Chapter V. This 
synthetic model was developed as the constant comparative analysis was resumed 
through the application of selected theory toward the original source case, i.e., through 
the lens of national security strategy in the abstract, but now equipped with the theoretical 
machinery espoused in Phase 2. The synthetic model represents a series of maxims for 
the analysis of a complex social system, developed through a study of contemporary 
national security strategy in the context of world affairs and informed through the 
application of selected social theory. A discussion and hypothetical applications of the 
synthetic model are presented in Chapter VI. 
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D. ASSUMPTIONS, PROPOSITIONS, AND LIMITS 
This thesis proceeds from two key assumptions: 
(1) That the 2015 NSS is a legitimate representation and embodiment of the 
national security goals of the United States and how the United States 
understands itself and its place in the world, and that the Strategy is not 
intentionally contradictory, vague, or deceptive in its form or content; and, 
(2) That officially-promulgated security strategy has practical bearing on the 
decision-making of the human actors charged with and impacted by its 
implementation. 
Likewise, a foundational assumption of this thesis is that security strategy can be 
improved through the application of insights from a broad range of social theory. The 
question of how feasible it may be to implement such improvement—especially in light 
of potential challenges in public policy, bureaucratic and legal frameworks and mandates, 
and added practical value versus potential costs or losses—is left aside for future 
discussion. 
Most importantly, the synthetic framework proposed in this thesis has been 
derived exclusively from the study of strategy in the context of security studies. While 
this thesis is limited in that it engages but one of many national-level strategies, it is the 
hope of the author that this work will contribute to ongoing and future dialogues about 
how best to develop and improve the national security of the United States. The 
framework presented, insofar as it provides a method of accounting for motivations and 
behaviors of a wide range of actors, may also inform similar discussions about strategy in 
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II. THE EVIDENT STRATEGY 
The role of strategy is to set priorities among the almost endless list of 
tasks that might be taken up by the world’s leading power. 
— Ashton Carter, “Adapting U.S. Defence to Future Needs,”  
Survival, January 1999 
 
A. STRATEGY AS A PHENOMENON 
The United States has broad engagement with the world. In the 21st century, 
engagement is complicated by factors like the spread of information technology and 
cyberspace, tackling poverty and disease at home and abroad, fighting international 
terrorism, and advocating for the rule of law and American values across the globe. To 
effectively align its resources and interests in these fights, the United States must employ 
strategy. Strategy, in its simplest formula, is about winning. Winning does not necessarily 
mean defeating an opponent. “What winning must entail,” in the words of McMaster, “is 
a rational determination to achieve a sustainable outcome, usually a political outcome, 
consistent with vital interests.”9 Winning, then, must be understood not in terms of 
absolute finality, but rather as a continuation of a current state of affairs, at least in part, 
into a future that is sustainable, acceptable, and tenable by the inhabitants of that future. 
“History’s great strategists,” Yarger says, succeeded at “combining art and science in an 
ability to perceive the realities, relationships, and possibilities of their environment, and 
integrating them successfully in formulating strategy.”10 
Strategy is both “a theory and a way of acting.”11 “To act” implies engagement 
and interaction with the world—either through trial-and-error (akin to fumbling in the 
dark), through routine and habitual processes (experience), or through purposeful, goal-
                                                 
9 H.R. McMaster, “The Uncertainties of Strategy,” Survival 57, no. 1 (January 2, 2015): 202, 
doi:10.1080/00396338.2015.1008323. 
10 Harry Richard Yarger, Strategy and the National Security Professional: Strategic Thinking and 
Strategy Formulation in the 21st Century (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2008), 6. 
11 Julian Lider, “Towards a Modern Concept of Strategy,” Cooperation and Conflict 16, no. 4 
(November 1, 1981): 233, doi:10.1177/001083678101600402. 
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oriented interactions. It is this latter type of interaction that may be described as 
“strategic.” In order to develop strategic action, a theory of what the world is, what its 
components are, and how they interact is required. Such a theory of the world is, in 
essence, an ontology: a comprehensive, systematic understanding of what “is.” Ontology 
likewise enables one to know when an explanation about or presentation of what “is” 
does not comport with reality. One’s ontology facilitates the division of reality from 
fantasy. When grounded in an accurate ontology, strategy enables maintenance of agency 
in the face of the unknown and the complex. Absent an accurate ontology, action 
regresses from the strategic to the rote, or, at worst, to the fated.  
Theories of what strategy should be, how it should be constructed, and how 
extensive a role strategy fulfills in human society are numerous and dissonant. In the 
national security domain, one way of understanding strategy is as a tool which fills the 
role of “problem solver.” For instance, a review of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review 
observes that the European region is characterized as a ““producer of security” rather 
than a consumer.”12 In this context, security strategy may be understood as a plan for 
managing the distribution of a limited resource—security is quantized: created in some 
areas and lost in others. The problems solved in this regard are those of resource 
management: strategy enables the efficient management and deployment of military, 
economic, diplomatic, and intelligence forces and assets. Strategy, in this way, informs 
the “what” of the actions undertaken by United States: here a void is to be filled and 
some action taken, and there a void left empty and some other action left undone. Insofar 
as the actions of the United States also embody the potential of the nation—’what the 
United States is’—strategy determines what the nation structurally consists of and how it 
relates to the rest of the world on the strategic plane. The United States cannot be all 
things to all people: strategy determines which things the United States will be, and to 
whom. 
                                                 
12 William J. Perry and John P. Abizaid, “Ensuring a Strong U.S. Defense for the Future: The National 
Defense Panel Review of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review” (Washington, DC: United States Institute 
of Peace, 2014), 24, http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/
oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA604218. 
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In order to understand the “why” of what the United States does—or “is” to its 
observers—strategy must be knowledgeable about the outside world in which it is 
expected to function. Providing decision-makers with the underlying logic for 
understanding happenings throughout the world’s regions is a cornerstone of the national 
intelligence mission space. The analysis and interpretation of intelligence is, however, 
notably subjective and limited—the United States is not omniscient. Ensuring that 
strategy is informed with an understanding of the world as free from bias as possible 
therefore implies a continuing need to “get more” intelligence.13 Thus, national security 
strategy must also solve the problems of detecting, understanding, and communicating 
information about the world within and among bureaucracies, leadership circles, 
international audiences, and various other publics.  
These problems do not emerge in a vacuum; rather, they exist within the complex 
milieu of social and political life, with all the complications and opportunities associated 
therewith.14 Therefore, strategy is not merely a plan or goal—it is performative, it 
determines what the United States may know, and it embodies what the United States 
does know about the world.15 As the intelligence resources needed to understand the 
world are not limitless, the logic and understanding provided by the intelligence 
                                                 
13 Kevin Russell, “The Subjectivity of Intelligence Analysis and Implications for the U.S. National 
Security Strategy,” SAIS Review 24, no. 1 (2004): 160, doi:10.1353/sais.2004.0019. 
14 Indeed, the socio-political milieu itself provides valuable material for analysts in security studies, 
whether studying macro-politics, bureaucratic decision-making, or individual leaders. See, for example, the 
discussion of foreign policy analysis models in Valerie M. Hudson and Christopher S. Vore, “Foreign 
Policy Analysis Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow,” Mershon International Studies Review 39, no. 2 
(1995): 216, doi:10.2307/222751. 
15 Annemarie Mol’s concept of performance as that act which reifies a particular reality in a 
multiplicity of realities is relevant here. Speaking of a medical specimen being examined by a variety of 
different tools, she says: “Instead of attributes or aspects, they are different versions of the object, versions 
that the tools help to enact. They are different and yet related objects. They are multiple forms of reality. 
Itself.” Similarly, Luiza Bialasiewicz reminds us that performativity is not derivative; it is constitutive: 
“Performative means that discourses constitute the objects of which they speak. For example, states are 
made possible by a wide range of discursive practices that include immigration policies, military 
deployments and strategies, cultural debates about normal social behaviour, political speeches and 
economic investments. The meanings, identities, social relations and political assemblages that are enacted 
in these performances combine the ideal and the material. They are either made or represented in the name 
of a particular state but that state does not pre-exist those performances.” Annemarie Mol, “Ontological 
Politics. A Word and Some Questions,” The Sociological Review 47, no. S1 (1999): 77; Luiza Bialasiewicz 
et al., “Performing Security: The Imaginative Geographies of Current U.S. Strategy,” Political Geography 
26, no. 4 (May 2007): 406, doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2006.12.002.  
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community is necessarily incomplete. Strategy therefore also involves a cost-benefit 
calculation that wagers to most accurately understand the “why” of certain domains, 
regions, and efforts, while accepting that a relatively less complete understanding of other 
areas will be acceptable to leadership and to the nation. 
B. STRATEGY AS A PRODUCT AND A PROCESS 
Politics is a study in motion and change. It is important to acknowledge the very 
different implications of strategy as an inscription from those of strategy reified in action: 
“Strategy is what strategists do.”16 Strategy is action.17 More precisely, strategy is guided 
interaction among actors intended toward achieving desired effects. The interactions and 
effects contemplated can and do involve both human society and the broader natural 
world in which that society exists.  
Unfortunately, many theoretical frames employed in the formulation of policy 
employ a static, process-based understanding of reality—a world of truth-claims and 
contested discourse. When animated, change is often depicted in the form of snapshots—
stops and starts—which may be an artifact of our tendency to construct mental 
representations of imagined futures and alternate states without necessarily giving ample 
thought to the chains of events that would ensue should we begin to proceed toward such 
an imagined future.18 In reality, change is complex and fluid; complexity and fluidity are 
inherently difficult to capture in policy, but change is central to the discursive moves of 
politics. Political discourse is a closed system in which ideas, terms, and concepts are 
                                                 
16 Chris Carter, Stewart R. Clegg, and Martin Kornberger, A Very Short, Fairly Interesting and 
Reasonably Cheap Book About Studying Strategy (SAGE, 2008), 7. 
17 It is important to emphasize that “doing” strategy does not necessitate reducing “strategy as action” 
to “strategy as practice.” See, for instance: C. Carter, S. R. Clegg, and M. Kornberger, “So!apbox: Editorial 
Essays: Strategy as Practice?,” Strategic Organization 6, no. 1 (February 1, 2008): 83–99, doi:10.1177/
1476127007087154.  
18 Referring to President Bush’s 2002 National Security Strategy and its doctrine of preemption, 
Huehls says “Not only does this doctrine reduce temporality to presentness, but it also sacrifices lived 
experience on the altar of discursive speech acts. … Because the future is now, we must act as if now were 
that future.” See Mitchum Huehls, “Knowing What We Are Doing: Time, Form, and the Reading of 
Postmodernity,” Cultural Critique 61, no. 1 (2005): 57, doi:10.1353/cul.2005.0034.  
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inherently unfixed and debated in contrast—”There is no extra-discursive referent to 
which they are tied.”19 Everything—both action and words—is discourse. 
Our political behavior is habitually focused on a desired end state: a point on the 
horizon. The seas between us and that point, however, can be stormy. Theoretical 
constructs of a world in stasis, while affording the benefit of easily envisioning 
alternative futures, come at the expense of modeling the fluidity and motion of observed 
social behavior. Thus, it is important to recognize the distinction between stasis and 
stability. A world in stasis is imaginary. A stable world is coherent. Stability does not 
imply stasis—rather, it implies interconnectivity and wholeness.20 A stable world may 
represent a dynamic and ever-changing system—but it is a coherent system nonetheless, 
where each part mutually constitutes other parts. It is the interconnectedness of the 
system that both bounds and enables its constituents to exist and to act. As the observer 
and the subject are always mutually constructed, the attainment of our goals in turn 
changes us. If, for example, we adopt a strategy that aims to fix the world to some 
particular or ideal future alternative, we must acknowledge that attainment of that 
alternative will also entail attainment of an alternative “us” as brought about by the new 
context or paradigm. 
Once informed about forces to be employed and the domains in which those 
forces will operate, security strategy must, ultimately, solve a problem of action: how 
extensive and of what nature should engagement be? Along the continuum of 
engagement, two loci have recently been highlighted for the United States: in one, 
referred to as “deep engagement,” the United States strives to be omnipresent, pro-
actively deploying its resources and so risking exposure, entanglement, and immobility.21 
The other locus of interest is, essentially, retrenchment: a conscious non-engagement that 
actively seeks to watch from afar and pursue involvement abroad only after ample 
                                                 
19 Ty Solomon, “Time and Subjectivity in World Politics,” International Studies Quarterly 58, no. 4 
(2014): 674, doi:10.1111/isqu.12091. 
20 Stewart R. Clegg and Mark Haugaard, The SAGE Handbook of Power (SAGE, 2009), 132. 
21 See the discussion by Friedman et al. in Campbell Craig et al., “Debating American Engagement: 
The Future of U.S. Grand Strategy,” International Security 38, no. 2 (October 2013): 183–92, doi:10.1162/
ISEC_c_00140. 
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consideration of circumstances. Such characterizations change with, and are intricately 
linked to, policy. For illustration, consider that, in the late 1990s, four evident options for 
future U.S. security strategy were neo-isolationism, selective engagement, cooperative 
security, and primacy.22 In answering characterization, the problem to be solved by a 
security strategy is that of communicating the mode of rationalization through which 
decisions will be taken, and such generalizations are intended to mimic a strategy’s 
underlying assumptions and aims—how the strategy operates and what it intends to 
accomplish.  
Lastly, however, strategy must speak not only to operation and effects but also to 
its genesis: the value systems in which it is created and the actors that are entrained 
toward its employment. In this, strategy must solve the problem of “why:” first, to garner 
the broadest possible support among those who would implement it; and, second, to 
justify its own ontological viability. Strategy is future-oriented. As such, a security 
strategy, when portraying idealized futures, may freely expound desired values and ideals 
as a gloss or simplification without necessarily taking into account either the subjective 
perspectives and experiences of individuals or previous analogous occasions which 
conflict with the strategy’s logic or assumptions.23 Strategy is about the realization of a 
specific, alternative future. It is the concept of entrainment that most closely describes the 
process synchronizing and drawing-in participants in terms of shared worldview, 
alignment of incentives, and actual task-organization toward desired ends. Strategy 
represents a process that, if successful, yields real human behavior entrained toward the 
strategic purpose. On the one hand, myriad micro-scale relations together constitute a 
strategy’s performative potential: a strategy is comprised of many actors and incentives. 
On the other hand, the cumulative potential and net effect of these entrained interests 
                                                 
22 Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy,” International 
Security 21, no. 3 (1996): 5–53. 
23 For instance, it has been noted that previous U.S. National Security Strategy has been hypocritical 
in its treatment of “nonnegotiable” universal values. See the discussion on “human dignity” in James Der 
Derian, “Decoding The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” Boundary 2 30, no. 3 
(2003): 21. 
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define a strategy’s quality, persistence, and the achievement of the result that was sought 
from the outset: strategy as a product.  
C. STRATEGY IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY DOMAIN 
1. Requirement and Context of the U.S. National Security Strategy  
As part of defense reforms of the late 1980s, the United States Congress mandated 
the creation of a report outlining a “national security strategy of the United States;” this 
report, which would become known as the National Security Strategy (NSS), was to be 
submitted annually along with the president’s budget request.24 While the United States 
certainly articulated and engaged various strategies prior to this codified requirement, a 
number of factors made a tangible strategy, written and endorsed by the executive, seem 
appealing: 
Few in the Congress at that time doubted that there existed a grand 
strategy. The nation had been following “containment” in one form or 
another for over 40 years. What they doubted, or disagreed with, was its 
focus in terms of values, interests and objectives; its coherence in terms of 
relating means to ends; its integration in terms of the elements of power; 
and its time horizon. In theory, at least to the reformers, a clearly written 
strategy would serve to inform the Congress better on the needs for 
resources to execute the strategy, thus facilitating the annual authorization 
and appropriation processes, particularly for the Department of Defense. 
[Emphasis in original]25 
The NSS is required to address several facets of U.S. national security and foreign 
policy; specifically, the Congressionally-mandated contents of the NSS include the 
following five concerns, which are spelled out in the law:26 
                                                 
24 The NSS requirement was included in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1986. NSS’s have not necessarily been submitted on an annual basis. Additionally, 
while the law requires the submission of both classified and unclassified NSS documents, reportedly only 
unclassified versions have been submitted by recent administrations. See Dale, “National Security 
Strategy,” 3. See also Nathan J. Lucas, “The 2015 National Security Strategy: Authorities, Changes, Issues 
for Congress” (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 2, 2015), 6. 
25 Don M. Snider, “National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision. Final Report” (Carlisle 
Barracks, PA: Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1995), 2, http://www.osti.gov/scitech/biblio/
107902. 
26 Taken from Lucas, “The 2015 National Security Strategy: Authorities, Changes, Issues for 
Congress,” 1. 
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(1) The worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that 
are vital to the national security of the United States. 
(2) The foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense 
capabilities of the United States necessary to deter aggression and to 
implement the national security strategy of the United States. 
(3) The proposed short-term and long-term uses of the political, economic, 
military, and other elements of the national power of the United States to 
protect or promote the interests and achieve the goals and objectives 
referred to in paragraph (1). 
(4) The adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to carry out the 
national security strategy of the United States, including an evaluation of 
the balance among the capabilities of all elements of the national power of 
the United States to support the implementation of the national security 
strategy. 
(5) Such other information as may be necessary to help inform Congress 
on matters relating to the national security strategy of the United States. 
Each NSS represents the culmination of other ongoing strategic planning and 
visioning processes within the executive branch of government; the NSS also presents a 
keystone upon which these ancillary efforts may build future iterations. Two prominent 
examples are the department-wide, multi-year strategic planning efforts undertaken 
within the departments of Defense and State.27 As somewhat of a synthesis of these 
larger and disparate processes, the NSS is a gestalt: the document is complex and imparts 
many meanings to many different readers.  
The NSS speaks to diverse interests and to many audiences. Issued by the highest 
office in the United States government, it exists as part of a broader landscape of political 
dialogue and rhetoric. The inclusion of selected policy issues and the NSS’s manner of 
articulating its expressed interests and concerns are each significant on their own merits. 
The topical repertoire and semantic construction of the NSS serve to signal the issues, 
political priorities, and concerns of a president’s administration to the world.28 It is 
                                                 
27 For instance, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and Quadrennial Diplomacy and 
Development Review (QDDR) processes formulate strategic guidance that both informs and is informed by 
the NSS. See Lucas, “The 2015 National Security Strategy: Authorities, Changes, Issues for Congress.” 
28 See, for instance, Snider, “National Security Strategy,” 5. 
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significant to observe that the audiences of the NSS are both foreign and domestic, and 
include both private (lay citizenry) and public (bureaucratic) consumers. Signaling the 
importance of consumers, Don Snider and other officials who participated in several NSS 
development cycles in the late 1980s and early 1990s identify five principal ways in 
which the NSS serves as a vehicle for communicating worldview and strategy to diverse 
audiences: 
(1) Communicating to Congress in order to provide foundation for 
presidential policy decisions and budgetary requests; 
(2) Communicating to various foreign and domestic constituencies; 
(3) Communicating to specific domestic audiences, such as donors and special 
interests of significance to the administration; 
(4) Communicating to officials within the executive branch in order to align 
internal policies and build consensus; and, 
(5) Communicating general context in support of the president’s overall 
agenda.29 
Importantly, the NSS is not necessarily “the only, or the principal, or even the 
most desirable means for the President to articulate publicly his strategic vision;” the 
NSS is only part of an overarching process through which the president and executive 
branch communicate policy and strategy on an ongoing basis, through various media, and 
in many fora.30 Consequently, articulating an objective and accurate understanding of the 
NSS is problematic. The present analysis leaves aside considerations as to whether the 
NSS should endorse any particular flavor or formulation of public policy. Rather than 
focus on the subjective value or appropriateness of its content, this analysis examines the 
NSS’s thematic concepts and motifs. The intent is not to argue that the NSS is more or 
less accurate—or subjectively appropriate—than it should be. At issue, instead, is the 
structural, theoretical, and ontological integrity and coherence of the reality crafted by the 
2015 National Security Strategy—in essence, the consistency, precision, and logical 
construction of its thematic concepts and motifs. 
                                                 
29 Ibid., 5–6. 
30 Ibid., 4. 
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2. The 2015 National Security Strategy 
a. Setting the Stage 
President Obama’s second NSS was submitted in the spring of 2015. This NSS 
has been characterized by its emphasis on an active leadership role for the United States, 
as it calls for “leading with strength,” “leading by example,” and “leading with a long-
term perspective.”31 This NSS was presented at a time when analysts and observers were 
debating the relative volatility of geopolitics; events in the year leading up to the release 
of the 2015 NSS—such as the rise of ISIL, the ongoing deterioration of the Syrian 
conflict, and behavior by Russia and China that was increasingly assertive regionally—
were argued by some as signaling a fundamentally novel state of geopolitical affairs, 
while others argued that these events were merely more recent instantiations of older 
patterns and routines.32  
The 2015 NSS opens into “complex times” in a world with “no shortage of 
challenges.”33 In light of its ostensible purpose being to set forth clearly-defined goals 
and visions of their achievement, it is noteworthy that this NSS takes such pains to 
describe its world as one that is analytically intimidating. In this vein, a central theme of 
the NSS is the demarcation of various threat domains the United States must both enter 
into and dominate. These threat domains are not all geopolitical in a traditional sense, and 
they may be understood to include both causes and effects. For causes, the NSS looks to 
such varied issues as extreme poverty, violent extremism, weak states, and anthropogenic 
climate change. In effects, the NSS fixes conflict, economic downturn, and erosion of the 
rules based international order in which the system of states is understood to exist. While 
the direction of these causal relationships are clearly debatable, there is a striking 
juxtaposition of “Enduring National Interests” such as “universal values” and “security of 
                                                 
31 Lucas, “The 2015 National Security Strategy: Authorities, Changes, Issues for Congress,” 2. 
32 Thomas Wright, “Interpreting the National Security Strategy” (The Brookings Institution, February 
6, 2015), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2015/02/06-interpreting-the-national-security-
strategy. 
33 Barack Obama, “National Security Strategy” (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 
February 1, 2015), 1, 2, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/
2015_national_security_strategy.pdf. 
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the United States … [and its] allies and partners”—the same as set forth in the NSS’s 
2010 predecessor—against the “top strategic risks” facing the United States: in short, an 
array of events such as overt hostile attack, loss of economic viability, and disintegration 
of the normative system of world order, any one or more of which could rob the United 
States of its agency.34 
In some ways, the 2015 NSS is unabashedly equivocal, employing language 
characterized by one commentator as “merciless governmentese,” making clear and 
neutral readings troublesome.35 In its goals and objectives, the document has been 
criticized for its “relative inattention to prioritization or to the strategic logic of how to 
respond to the countermoves of our adversaries,” at a time when the Obama 
administration is argued to have bungled key events in foreign affairs, such as having 
failed to predict and prevent Russian aggression in Ukraine.36 Nonetheless, any structural 
analysis must take the document on its own merits and grant three assertions: that the 
authors of the 2015 NSS did intend it to constitute an ostensible strategy for the United 
States as a nation engaged in global affairs; that the document speaks to certain definite 
interests and goals that the United States desires to pursue and fulfill; and, further, that 
the document’s narrative, themes, and content are not arbitrary but essential. 
The United States of the 2015 NSS is not a nation defined by exogenous values or 
goals but instead is an actor defined by its means of interaction with a larger world. As 
such, the threat domains it contemplates are not those existential threats which might 
undercut the foundations of national power, such as a major domestic upheaval or 
breakdown of government. Rather, the myriad contingencies that might suddenly befall 
the United States are those which limit the field of engagement opportunities available to 
U.S. policy-makers and the time available in which such engagement might take place. 
Consider one example from the listed threats: “proliferation and/or use of weapons of 
                                                 
34 Ibid., 2. 
35 Janine Davidson, “Obama’s Last National Security Strategy” (Foreign Affairs, August 21, 2015), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2015-03-02/obamas-last-national-security-strategy. 
36 Peter Feaver, “Grading Obama’s National Security Strategy 2.0” (Foreign Policy, February 6, 
2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/06/grading-obamas-national-security-strategy-2-0. 
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mass destruction [WMD].”37 The message of this NSS is not merely that a WMD, such 
as an improvised nuclear device, might itself cause great harm and destruction; it is, more 
so, that the availability or utilization of WMD might suddenly change the calculus 
through which U.S. strategy is crafted. In essence, the threats listed in the NSS are not 
necessarily “bad” because they are dangerous, they are “bad” because they are 
destabilizing. In this sense, then, the United States of the NSS is especially sensitive to 
concerns that could threaten the logic through which it sees the world; i.e., when facing a 
threat, the NSS is constrained to some extent by the status quo ante “sunk costs” of U.S. 
diplomacy and engagement. 
b. Identifying the Self and Others 
The 2015 NSS presents “a diversified and balanced set of priorities” for “the 
world’s leading global power with interests in every part of an increasingly 
interconnected world.”38 The central thematic concept of the 2015 NSS is, therefore, 
positioning the United States on the world stage. The first move taken in the NSS toward 
positioning the United States is the establishment of the nation-state as a “self.” The 
United States is presented as an actor that exists within and interacts with a larger world 
but which is also distinct from that larger world. But, the strategy is neither global nor 
balanced: the self and the rest of the world are innately different. The NSS positions the 
United States as if peering across a horizon or frontier beyond which lie the unknowns 
with which the United States must wrestle. Its first task, then, is to separate the “self” 
from “other” and to impart the rules and logics pertinent to each half of this dyad. 
The United States of the NSS is a complex actor: a “self” with many faces. The 
NSS speaks throughout in the first person plural; in his letter of transmittal, Obama 
speaks of “our national security,” “our interests,” “our influence,” and “our history.”39 
The 2015 NSS uses the word “we” over 350 times, as depicted in Table 1; the “we” 
speaking in the NSS is often unclear. In some places, “we” refers to the people of the 
                                                 
37 Obama, “National Security Strategy,” 2. 
38 Ibid., 5. 
39 Ibid., i. 
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United States, while in others it refers to the United States acting jointly with allies and 
partners, to the larger community of states, or to humanity in general. In fact, over 50% 
of the sentences in the NSS contain the word “we.” As a result, when discussing goals, 
relationships, and intentions, the narrative of the NSS continually shifts between multiple 
layers and faces of U.S. identity. The partners and potentials entrained in the NSS are not 
clearly defined.40 
Table 1. Word Count of Selected Identity Markers in the 2015 
National Security Strategy 
Word No. of Occurrences in 2015 NSS 
We 359 





In general, the NSS presents a United States identified as either a state proper (the 
United States of America) or as a state acting together with allies. The NSS also refers 
more generally to the American people, its military, and its citizens, in addition to other 
facets of U.S. identity. Taken together, these faces of the United States constitute the “us” 
of the NSS. The relative importance of these identity markers to the language of the NSS 
can be ascertained from Figure 1, which depicts the percentage of sentences in the 
                                                 
40 The analysis of identity markers presented here is intended to be merely illustrative rather than 
comprehensive; the nouns and pronouns in Table 1 have been selected for their convenience to the present 
narrative. These words, however, are constitutive of discursive identity, as observed by Bauaman: “Identity 
is an emergent construction, the situated outcome of a rhetorical and interpretive process in which 
interactants make situationally motivated selections from socially constituted repertoires of identificational 
and affiliational resources and craft these semiotic resources into identity claims for presentation to others. 
This is clearly a productive line of inquiry.” Richard Bauman, “Language, Identity, Performance,” 
Pragmatics 10, no. 1 (2000): 1; also see Dorien Van De Mieroop, “An Integrated Approach of Quantitative 
and Qualitative Analysis in the Study of Identity in Speeches,” Discourse & Society 16, no. 1 (2005): 107–
130.  
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document containing selected words and phrases used to convey the identity of the 
United States as an actor. For instance, when the NSS refers to the U.S. military, such as 
in “our military will remain ready,” it necessarily speaks to an entity separate and distinct 
from the other constituent parts of U.S. identity;41 likewise, the NSS speaks elsewhere of 
an “us” that evidently includes the military. The relevant observation here is that the NSS 
is unclear as to when it is speaking of the United States as a monolithic whole, as an 
amalgamation of interrelated components, or as a super-ordinate merger of U.S. identity 
along with that of its allies. There is an “us” that includes the military, an “us” that does 
not, and an “us” that includes states other than the U.S. 
 
                                                 




Figure 1. Sentence Coverage of Selected U.S. Identity Markers in the 
2015 National Security Strategy 
A second task in positioning the United States in the NSS concerns the 
establishment and identification of “others.” The “others” of the NSS stand in ontological 
opposition to the United States as an entity, though not necessarily in strategic or political 
opposition; the word enemy does not appear anywhere in the document, and the softer 
term adversary is used only sparingly.42 In addition to other states, the NSS refers to 
multi-national, regional, and inter-national institutions like the United Nations, the 
African Union, and the Association of Southeast Asian States. The NSS also places 
significance throughout on sub-state and non-state actors, such as terrorist groups and 
subnational political and demographic blocks. When referring to groups like the 
impoverished, the repressed, women, and youth, the NSS is understandably vague. These 
broad categories are also weakly articulated in terms of their relationships with other 
                                                 
42 Adversary occurs only six times in the 2015 NSS. 
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categories of actors; these disadvantaged exist, but the NSS does not fix their location in 
space and time—they are abstract yet significant anchors of the NSS’s narrative. 
The general schema of the United States’ relationships with its allies and “others” 
is depicted in Figure 2, which shows the U.S. at the center—sometimes, closely 
identifying with allies, partner states, and coalitions—in juxtaposition with other states, 





Figure 2. 2015 NSS Conceptualizations of Identity and Interaction 
with Others 
 Insofar as labels such as adversaries and the poor are understood to refer to 
specific actors, these imaginary labels also imply the existence of their opposites: in this 
example, allies and the non-poor, respectively. Consequently, in order to be considered 
holistic, the text of the NSS should somehow map these opposites back to their 
corollaries as identified elsewhere in the document. The NSS, however, does not provide 




vulnerability of the poor” and advancing “the imperative of accountable, democratic 
governance” in its aim of ending extreme poverty.43 Unaddressed are concerns such as 
how efforts to modify the socioeconomic status of the poor will also affect and 
accommodate the non-poor. In so-called “failed states,” conventional development aid is 
problematic as weak and corrupt governments often lack the capacity or will to 
implement aid programs in an effective and transparent manner; aid is often diverted to 
support the interests of those in power, rather than employed to the advantage of the poor 
who are, allegedly, in need.44 Thus, to speak of engaging national ends to “end extreme 
poverty” is also to speak of accounting for engaging those actors who exist in dualism 
with the world’s poor.45 The NSS does not clearly account for these other implied actors; 
in essence, the NSS speaks of some “others” in purely conceptual terms, leaving aside 
concerns of context: how, when, and where they exist in relation to the world’s other 
constituent actors. 
c. Putting the World in Motion 
Having established a playing field on which the United States exists in relation to 
the rest of the world, the NSS then moves to animate that world. The NSS does not, 
however, provide a unified model for “how the world works.” Rather, it seeks to describe 
the world as it operates in accordance with, or against, the proclaimed values of the 
United States. Foremost among these values is the definitive role played by the rule of 
                                                 
43 Obama, “National Security Strategy,” 18. 
44 For instance, Mallaby’s discussion of the frustrations of aid initiatives is informative. Aid officials 
at the World Bank worked diligently to provide aid to Chad that would not be subject to graft by the 
country’s corrupt government. “Within six months, however, Chad’s government found a way of diverting 
$4.5 million … to finance unauthorized arms purchases.” Sebastian Mallaby, “The Reluctant Imperialist: 
Terrorism, Failed States, and the Case for American Empire,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 2 (2002): 2–7; Also 
see United States Institute of Peace, “Governance, Corruption, and Conflict” (United States Institute of 
Peace, 2010), 5, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/ETC-D/NPEC/480021.PDF. 
45 As an example, how the introduction of development capital may interfere with the free will and 
independence of the so-called failed states; see Susanne Soederberg, “American Imperialism and New 
Forms of Disciplining the ‘Non-Integrating Gap,’ in Neoliberalism in Crisis, Accumulation, and Rosa 
Luxemburg’s Legacy, vol. 21, Research in Political Economy (Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing 
Limited, 2004), 31–60, http://www.emeraldinsight.com/10.1016/S0161-7230(04)21002-1. 
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law in the international system of states: the world of the NSS is a world of rules.46 
Indeed, one of the four “enduring national interests” put forth by the NSS is “A rules-
based international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and 
opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.”47  
Consequently, a second thematic concept of the NSS is articulating an 
understanding of acceptable behavior within the context of the “long-standing norms of 
international behavior” to which the United States subscribes.48 Actors who do not 
comply with these international norms are presented as “adversaries” and 
“transgressors.”49 Significantly, the NSS makes a truth claim in its proposition of 
“universal values;” it is evident that the NSS’s assertion of the universality of these 
values is a performative argument for their universalization—if the values were 
universal, they would not need to be “champion[ed] around the world.”50 Therefore, 
neither a desire to reify universal values nor resistance to universal values provides a 
sufficient explanation for articulating the motives and goals of the actors in the NSS. 
Motives for non-compliance are only loosely explored. For the broad concern of 
terrorism, causality is related to “underlying conditions … such as poverty, inequality, 
and repression”—terrorist ideologies are only addressed twice, as “dangerous” and 
“extremist” ideologies, respectively.51 State motives are essentially absent; Russian 
actions in the Ukraine are characterized simply as “aggression” from a “belligerent 
stance.”52 The NSS omits any substantive discussion of how these actors are motivated 
or of the ends they seek; signal words like “motive,” “reason,” and “factor” do not appear 
anywhere in the document. While it conceives a world of moving parts, the NSS lacks 
altogether an exposition of why the parts are in motion.  
                                                 
46 And, it is a common criticism of American strategy that the U.S. seeks to remake the world in its 
own image, exporting its own interpretation of rules and values. 
47 Obama, “National Security Strategy,” 2. 
48 Ibid., 13. 
49 Ibid., 9, 23. 
50 Ibid., 20. 
51 Ibid., 7–9. 
52 Ibid., 10. 
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d. Providing for Decision and Agency 
A third thematic concept of the NSS is delimiting the extent of interaction on the 
part of the United States with the rest of the world. Essentially, this interaction is depicted 
as occurring whenever it suits the interests and needs of the United States. Throughout, 
the NSS provides many clues to what might be interpreted as “needs” and “interests;” 
several are directly pointed to as the “enduring national interests” of the United States:53 
(1) The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners; 
(2) A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international 
economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity; 
(3) Respect for universal values at home and around the world; and 
(4) A rules-based international order advanced by U.S. leadership that 
promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to 
meet global challenges. 
Other interests are found intertwined throughout the NSS’s narrative. For 
instance, a primary interest of the United States of the NSS is avoiding hypocritical 
behavior by adhering to its own espoused values and standards of conduct. The NSS calls 
on the United States to “live our values at home while promoting universal values 
abroad.”54 This assertion raises two lines of inquiry: what are “our” and “universal” 
values, and what role do they play in the world of the NSS? The “our” values of the NSS 
are broad and generic, but primarily refer to the rule of law and subordinate related 
concerns such as representative government, human rights, and rights to privacy and 
freedom of expression. The NSS’s “universal” values may succinctly be stated as a 
shared global responsibility to protect “our values” within the context of the rules-based 
international order. While nebulous and contested, these values and interests provide both 
the impetus for and the framework bounding activity and interaction in the worldview of 
the NSS. 
                                                 
53 Ibid., 2. 
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Interactions are couched in language of risk versus opportunity. The concept for 
employing military force provides perhaps the best example of the NSS’s employment of 
this formula, and its logic is generalizable to other means of interaction with the world 
not specifically articulated in the document: 
We will be principled and selective in the use of force. The use of force 
should not be our first choice, but it will sometimes be the necessary 
choice. The United States will use  military force, unilaterally if 
necessary, when our enduring interests demand it: when our people are 
threatened; when our livelihoods are at stake; and when the security of our 
allies is in danger. In these circumstances, we prefer to act with allies and 
partners. The  threshold for military action is higher when our interests 
are not directly threatened. In such cases, we will seek to mobilize allies 
and partners to share the burden and achieve lasting  outcomes. In all 
cases, the decision to use force must reflect a clear mandate and feasible 
objectives, and we must ensure our actions are effective, just, and 
consistent with the rule of law. It should be based on a serious 
appreciation for the risk to our mission, our global responsibilities, and the 
opportunity costs at home and abroad. Whenever and wherever we use 
force, we will do so in a way that reflects our values and strengthens our 
legitimacy.55 
In short, when facing any threat, the NSS seeks to engage the world when the 
benefits exceed the costs, and while giving preference to acting in concert with allies 
rather than acting alone. 
e. Articulating the Threat 
Any frame of oppositional interaction implies the existence of at least two distinct 
actors. The opposing forces in the NSS are not limited to discrete human actors like 
institutions, groups, or states; additionally, the actors presented in the NSS, aside from 
the multimodal “us,” are cast as either threatened or threatening. For instance, the NSS 
treats extensively several distinct threats to the international order, such as the 
proliferation of WMD. The United States of the NSS reifies the rules-based international 
order by acting through the rules-based processes of the international order to maintain 
the effability and integrity of that order. For instance, for the United States, adherence to 
WMD treaties and conventions gives them efficacy. When actors fail to adhere to such 
                                                 
55 Ibid., 8. 
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arrangements, or when such arrangements are undermined or bypassed altogether, the 
international order and consequently the United States are threatened.  
As such, a fourth thematic concept of the NSS is the identification of threats to the 
United States vis à vis the international order and the abstract humanity which constitutes 
it. The NSS accomplishes this task through the employment of a wide variety of 
oppositional pairing motifs, presented in Table 2, which frame the “us” of the NSS 
against opposing actors. While many of these pairings are not overtly defined, it is 
significant that the relevant actors also include non-human and quasi-human threats like 
climate change, economic downturn, and poverty. The NSS rarely explains how these 
opposing actors are threats other than in a general sense, but it explicitly identifies them 
as threats nonetheless. 
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Table 2.  Threat Motifs of the 2015 National Security Strategy 
Oppositional Pairing Representative Examples 
Us vs. Rising Powers Russia, China 
Us vs. Generic/Unknown Threat Disputes, crises, and shocks 
Us vs. Rule Breakers Unspecified transgressors, alternative models, 
Russian violation of Ukrainian sovereignty 
Us vs. Economic Threat Poverty, global recession 
Us vs. Terrorism/Crime al-Qa’ida, ISIL, organized crime 
Us vs. Weak/Failing States Unspecified weak and failing states 
Us vs. Nature Natural disasters, climate change 
Us vs. WMD/Technology Weapons of mass destruction, cyber threats 
Us vs. Uncooperative Powers North Korea, Iran, Libya, Syria 
Us vs. Ourselves Competing priorities, over-reach 
 
f. Synopsis 
The NSS presented in 2015 endeavors to engage a troubled world. It attempts to 
locate and distinguish the United States among its peers, set expectations for how it and 
its peers should interact and the goals they should seek, define the boundaries and 
components of the world, and identify that which threatens the United States. It defines 
the United States in terms of a nation-state in a position of leadership in its environment. 
It portrays, however, a United States that does not necessarily know “who” it is; it is an 
entity with many faces: sometimes a people, sometimes a state, sometimes a web of 
organizations, and sometimes a coalition. By eroding the boundaries between the United 
States as a homeland and the United States as reified through its overseas endeavors, the 
NSS reveals such geographic distinctions to be artificial. The NSS refrains from 
identifying, clearly, any enemy or adversary toward which its strategy is oriented.  
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The world of the NSS is populated by nebulous “others,” in the form of nation-
states, multi- and inter-national institutions, non-state actors, and imaginary categories of 
men. All of these actors are presented in interaction, but no rationale is exposed whereby 
their actions might be understood or predicted. In fact, the ontological foundation of 
action in the world of the NSS seems to be preservation of its own, internally-rationalized 
mode of interaction: universal values that primarily refer to maintenance of the rules-
based international order among the system of states. This is a cracked foundation, 
however, as the NSS acknowledges the various threats to that international order, both in 
terms of the latter’s existential viability as well as the United States’ relative position of 
leadership within that order. The interests of the United States in the NSS are essentially 
related to maintenance of relative advantage on the world stage. Threats to those interests 
are framed in terms of “us” versus “threat,” where threat may be read to mean anything 
destabilizing to the United States’ perceived position within the international order—its 
ego and agency. These threats comprise behaviors in violation of espoused international 
standards, disruptions due to natural and socio-economic forces, and inability to achieve 
and maintain sufficient internal power and cohesion to interact with the world effectively.  
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III. AN IDEAL STRATEGY 
The apple tree never asks the beech how he shall grow; nor the lion, the 
horse, how he shall take his prey. 
—William Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell 
 
A. THE STRATEGY’S EXIGENCY 
President Barack Obama’s 2015 National Security Strategy is only one of several 
to have been presented to Congress since the requirement was established. While one 
might presume that the United States has always faced threats warranting the formulation 
of national-level strategy, the 2015 NSS is offered at a time when world affairs are 
widely characterized as tumultuous and especially challenging for policy-makers. Henry 
Kissinger, as quoted in a 2015 RAND report that advocates for a fundamental “strategic 
rethink” of American foreign policy, asserted to Congress that America “has not faced a 
more diverse and complex array of crises since the end of the Second World War.”56 
Such an observation may be taken as part of a broader contemporary concern that 
formerly dominant modes of framing strategy and understanding how the world works—
such as the neatly dichotomous domains of Cold War bipolarity—are somehow 
inadequate and, if relied upon in today’s tumultuous environment, would leave America 
vulnerable to missed steps and misinformed execution in policy.  
If there has indeed been a shift in the strategic environment, it is perhaps best 
characterized by an increasing complexity of national security as a concept. Where 
security strategy has traditionally relied on military and economic power to interface with 
other state actors, the focus of strategy today includes social and political issues. Where 
the goal of strategy in the past may have been military or economic dominance, modern 
goals are much less clearly articulated. Development and state-building, for instance, are 
less easily measured or defined than a strict military victory or clear economic 
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hegemony; this shift is made clear in the words of Michael Sullivan, commenting on the 
difficulty of measuring success when military victory is not the object being sought: 
The rise and popularity of “small wars” in a more irregular environment, 
where the end game is population control rather than control of territory, 
has brought the military and political leader back together. No longer can 
the joint force commander simply ignore the other instruments of national 
power when security, stability, and peace do not equate to annihilation of 
an adversary’s forces [emphasis added].57  
As the end of the Cold War itself heralded uncertainty in world affairs, it also 
created opening for new frames and modes of thought. Two famous and oft-cited post-
Cold War philosophies are those offered by Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington.58  
In 1994, Turkish analyst Ahmet Davutoğlu59 answered these two particular paradigms—
Fukuyama’s assertion of a foreseeable “end of history” and Huntington’s wrestling with 
the inevitable “clash of civilizations,” respectively—by arguing that “The end of 
bipolarity has created sensitive regions where there is a vacuum of power needed to 
control the strategic capabilities of the geopolitical core as well as the vast resource 
production trade capabilities of the international political economy [emphasis added].”60 
Here, “geopolitical core” refers to the world’s major powers, whose competing interests 
and campaigns play out on proxy fields across the globe. 
In Davutoğlu’s worldview, it is dominance over this middle ground—what he 
terms the “sensitive regions”—that is the primary matter of contention among the world’s 
great powers. Such a perspective shifts the centrality of strategy from competing centers-
of-mass to a strategy based on between-ness. Davutoğlu differs from Fukuyama and 
Huntington by taking up a third position in which it is not necessarily the internal 
strength or integrity of the great powers’ cores which is determinative in strategy, but 
                                                 
57 Michael P. Sullivan, “How to Win and Know It: An Effects-Based Approach to Irregular Warfare” 
(Naval Postgraduate School, 2007), 63, http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/
oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA476057. 
58 Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?,” The National Interest 16, no. 4 (1989): 3–18; Samuel R. 
Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?,” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (1993): 22–49. 
59Davutoğlu would later rise to the office of Prime Minister of Turkey. 
60 Ahmet Davutoğlu, “The Clash of Interests: An Explanation of the World [Dis]order,” Intellectual 
Discourse 2, no. 2 (1994): 124. 
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rather great powers’ ability to exercise control over the marginal interfaces through which 
they engage with the wider world; this is a framework of influence more so than one of 
coercion or supremacy. Davutoğlu’s interface zones function as the gateways through 
which great powers—the geopolitical cores—interact with each other and the rest of the 
world. In essence, where conventional strategic frames present great powers as being 
engaged in a kind of tug-of-war with each other, this third view posits that the powers are 
tugging not on each other, but on a third, central object of contention between both 
anchors. Additionally, such an understanding presents a central proxy which, by its 
presence, enables the indirect interaction of opposing actors. In Davutoğlu’s case, the 
“central object” over which he asserts that dominance is questioned is an interface zone: 
the Middle East and other “sensitive regions” which bound the former Soviet Union, such 
as Southeast Asia and Eastern Europe. 
Interface zones have been a characteristic of intercultural and international 
relations throughout history; in many ways, an interface zone may be understood as a 
kind of frontier where the influences of competing cultures evolve and mix. Woolf relates 
the story of Cruptorix, a retired Roman soldier of the Frisian tribe living along the coast 
of the North Sea.61 After a failed military expedition in a time of civil turmoil, Cruptorix 
provided shelter to several hundred Roman soldiers who infamously committed mass 
suicide when they were later surrounded by the Frisii.62 Woolf uses the story of this 
foreign soldier to relate the importance of the “middle ground,” which were “places of 
creative hybridization,” in forming intercultural perceptions, such as those between the 
Germanic peoples and the Romans to their south:63  
Individuals like Cruptorix passed back and forward between societies, 
becoming to some extent bi-cultural as well as bi-lingual. Able to operate 
in worlds that seemed at first completely alien to each other, they became 
                                                 
61 Greg Woolf, “Cruptorix and His Kind. Talking Ethnicity on the Middle Ground,” in Ethnic 
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cultural mediators or brokers and participated in creating new 
accommodations and in finding new common meanings.64 
In the case of Rome, its frontier was ever expanding outward as the influence of 
the central core was consolidated over time. In the abstract, interfaces and frontiers 
between nations, societies, and cultures, however they may be framed, have always been 
important national security concepts. Today, however, all boundaries are permeable—
both physical and virtual boundaries are increasingly traversed. War, famine, and 
economic stress have contributed to mass migration around the world. Globalization and 
information technology have rendered the traditional focus on physical contact across 
fixed borders practically moot—cyberspace is a world of its own, with its own frontiers 
that do not align to political or geographic boundaries. The overarching implication for 
strategy is that clearly-defined spatial concepts and categories may be interconnected and 
traversable in many different, but not always immediately evident, ways.  
The observed modern world is more of a kaleidoscope than a puzzle: languages 
and ethnicities cross national borders, and international movements like Occupy and 
Anonymous take on life in the virtual environment of information that translates action 
into the physical world.65  In this vein, the world may be seen not only as a hierarchy of 
tiered, privileged categories (i.e., multi-national blocks, states, and intra-state divisions) 
but also as an interconnected web—a network of networks. These networks exist in 
overlapping spatiality; for instance, the virtual network world of the internet and the 
physical network world of human society share some nodes in space and time—in some 
ways a pair of intertwined worlds while in other ways a set of distinct realities.66 It is the 
interfaces between these networks that the NSS speaks to when discussing areas of 
conflict and contention over access and dominance in the modern world: the high seas, 
the internet, and, arguably, geographical interface zones like those identified by 
64 Ibid. 
65 Of course, states also operate in the virtual world and, according to Ashraf, view it both with a 
“rigid territorial approach” for purposes of regulation and also as a borderless stage on which the state 
seeks to project power. See Cameran Hooshang Ashraf, “The Spatiality of Power in Internet Control and 
Cyberwar” (University of California Los Angeles, 2015), http://escholarship.org/uc/item/0w99g31p. 
66 Ibid. 
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Davutoğlu. Likewise, the delineation of boundaries is not always black-and-white, as on 
a map, but is sometimes vague; a tendency for the United States to “integrate” with others 
has been noted in previous National Security Strategy formulations: “Simple binary 
oppositions are less useful to an understanding here than the process of incorporation and 
the policy of integration”—the United States actively seeks to recruit neutral “others” to 
its own quarter, to the exclusion of others.67 It is through this medium, then—on the 
middle ground—that the United States of the NSS must translate its goals and interests 
into material gains across the frontier beyond which its perceived threats reside. To do so, 
the United States must understand on what ground it stands and where its frontiers lie 
across many different domains; and, strategy must perform these frontiers. 
B. THE STRATEGY’S LIMITATION 
Management of state-to-state relations and conflict is no longer the sole focus of 
national security strategy. The continuing interplay of sub-state, transnational, and state 
actors in terms of preventing overt terrorist attacks, managing cyber warfare, working to 
end poverty and eradicate disease, and “countering violent extremism” necessitate 
security strategy and policy that can deftly interact with a broad spectrum of actors that 
ranges from the individual to multinational institutions. There is no single received 
framework that facilitates an effects-based or feasibility-based analysis of strategy across 
this spectrum, but there is a rich field of theory available to analysts interested in 
formulating security policy and strategy that might inform such a framework.  
As states control the world’s military forces, regulate travel across state borders, 
and regulate the conveyance of people, materiel, and information in the world generally, 
states, and their relationships, are certain to remain a key analytical frame for the 
foreseeable future. In this vein, international relations theory, which focuses on 
interactions among states, offers a variety of perspectives on geopolitical concerns. 
Schools of thought like realism in international relations explain state behavior as a 
function of a state’s relative position in the international anarchy. Other theories, like 
institutionalism, focus more on the interests of key actors. In general, though, most 
                                                 
67 Bialasiewicz et al., “Performing Security,” 415, 417. 
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theories of international relations array weaker actors against stronger ones; weakness is 
associated with risk and opportunity, strength with stability and enduring influence. 
Insofar as the NSS equates weak, failing, and fragile states with threat and risk, a problem 
of theoretical integrity exists: weak states are not always dangerous. The utility of 
international relations theories that explain state behavior within a neatly-ordered 
typology of an international system of states is thus called into question; to speak of 
states is also to speak of emerging states, the remnants of former states, and whatever 
other groups or entities together compose these “hybrid” forms.68 To answer these needs, 
a more scalable and fluid theory of states and their behavior is necessary. 
Violent conflict has been a characteristic phenomenon of human social interaction 
for millennia, and it remains so today. The contemporary security environment requires 
strategy that can deal with both individual and group actors at the state and sub-state 
level. In many conflicts, terrorism emerges as a label applied to tactics of actors both 
weak and strong. As relationships among social groups—group versus group, group 
versus nation, nation versus nation, nation versus state, and state versus state—are 
routinized, the stability and rationality of conflict become, in themselves, motives and 
means for interaction. In this way, an actor’s understanding of a world in conflict can 
both enable and restrict decision-making by affording ontological security.69 It is the so-
called “terrorist” groups involved, however—not the state—that frequently become the 
focus of interest in terroristic conflicts. Social constructivism offers perspective on the 
many overlapping levels of society in play, both within groups of individuals and within 
the so-called society of states. As an international relations theory, constructivism does 
not privilege the state as something of a fundamentally different nature than a “mere” 
social group like a formal terrorist organization. 
The NSS is, ultimately, a statist strategy that struggles to engage in a largely non-
state world. As the NSS fails to deal with the question of self-identity in a way that 
                                                 
68 Volker Boege et al., “On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging States: State Formation in the 
Context of ‘fragility,’” 2008, 6, 10, http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2011/2595/. 
69 Jennifer Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma,” 
European Journal of International Relations 12, no. 3 (September 1, 2006): 341–70, doi:10.1177/
1354066106067346. 
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clearly articulates the state’s relationship to the various non-state actors with which it 
must interact, the construction of the document precludes framing its reality on anything 
other than a foundation of conflict. Thus, resorting to alterity by defining the United 
States as that which stands against a wide array of threats, the strategy posited by the 
NSS and aimed at security is bound up with the discursive moves implicit in any conflict, 
which are succinctly summarized by Stern: 
First, the subject of security (“we”) is imbued with a certain identity … 
Second, this identity is constructed as stable and certain throughout time 
as self identical to the subject as it was “then”, as it is “now”, and as it will 
be into “the future”. Third, the subjects of security are inscribed as 
residing in a particular and demarcated space. Fourth, danger is named and 
threat identified. Spatial borders and boundaries both define this subject 
against the dangerous Other and protect it from the threats this Other 
poses. Fifth, cognitive borders and boundaries are established to 
distinguish an “us” from a “them”. These borders also prescribe codes that 
distinguish normalcy from deviance or betrayal, good from evil, Us from 
Them, etc. Sixth, despite the evocation of danger and threat, security 
discourses reassure us that order and safety are seemingly re-established – 
or at least promised – and are therefore immanent (the answer to security 
is in the past, embedded in the foundation, which is already known: how 
“we” were before). Seventh, security discourses set the stage for the 
enactment of certain security measures or strategies to ensure safety and 
survival as sovereign subjects in the face of dangerous Others.70 
Further, when dealing with alterity, it is important to note that the simple frames 
crafted in the NSS are necessarily dissonant with other, competing global strategic 
frames, as has been noted with previous National Security Strategy: “The spatialization 
of good and evil that results from these reinscribed binaries is in stark contrast to the 
imaginative geographies of other U.S. global discourses, especially that of the 
accelerating flows of globalization, which inevitably undermine such simplistic moral 
cartographies.”71  
Nonetheless, in politics, the threat of conflict implies the undertaking of security. 
Maintenance of status quo is often a default goal of security, and political theorists have 
                                                 
70 M. Stern, “‘We’ the Subject: The Power and Failure of (In)Security,” Security Dialogue 37, no. 2 
(June 1, 2006): 193–94, doi:10.1177/0967010606066171. 
71 Bialasiewicz et al., “Performing Security,” 417. 
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historically wrestled with “the important role of normative systems integral to the social 
world in sustaining a political order.”72 The NSS clearly articulates a number of threats to 
its perceived political order, the rules-based international system of states. Among these 
threats, perhaps most salient is that of terrorism and violent extremism. Terrorism does 
not threaten the liberal society envisioned in the NSS only because it may end lives. It 
threatens because it may change how one lives in that society: it is an affront to the rules 
of the rules-based order. Where saving lives is a goal of a security program, it is 
worthwhile to pause and consider how analytical paradigms understand the term “human 
life” and what role individual humans play in those paradigms as individual perceptions 
of reality are actualized during conflict. Bosold and Hynek note that the word “human” is 
problematic, often invokes a concept of “person” as referent object of the state, and that, 
when speaking of so-called universal values, “the only legitimate form of 
governmentality able to secure humans is [assumed to be] the liberal state.”73 Standing in 
direct opposition to such a governmentality are ISIS and al-Qa’ida: violent Salafi jihadist 
movements which reject the tenets of liberalism and embrace a form of Islamism that 
seeks to erase secular institutions. 
Terrorism, as a social epiphenomenon occurring within a broader field of social 
interaction and conflict, remains a vigorously debated subject. As with almost any social 
action, terrorism may be analyzed from both the point-of-view of the terrorist and from 
that of the terrorized, with each point-of-view offering different insights for strategy and 
policy formulation. Whether characterized as a strategy, a tactic, or a statement on socio-
political ideals, efforts to analyze and explain terrorism usually devolve into discussions 
of ethics, human rights, the order of the international system of states, tactics, value 
systems, and social and religious ideologies. Likewise, attempts to employ any particular 
rigorous analytical framework may result in analysis that is not readily consumable by 
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those unacquainted with the nuances of a particular theory or debate.74 Regardless, the 
individual human perspective and potential seems to be an important factor in terrorism 
and one that is not readily addressed from the global vantage point of the NSS; the NSS 
speaks of terrorists as amorphous groups, yet leaves unaddressed how individual human 
motivations are to be accounted for. 
Limitations such as these—that the “states” referred to in the NSS are not created 
equal, that the logic of the NSS is bound up in the discursive moves of securitization, and 
that even a concept as widely discussed as “terrorism” is impossible to define and grapple 
with from the strategic vantage point of the United States because of its innately 
individual implications—evidently have not precluded development of the strategy 
espoused in the NSS. They do, however, restrict the dexterity with which the NSS 
manipulates these concepts. In a fundamental way, the United States of the NSS is 
hampered by its inability to ascertain its own identity in a coherent fashion; thus, the 
ultimate limitation of the NSS is a schizophrenic entanglement with the “others” it 
creates in the actors—the allies, threats, and adversaries—that populate its world.  
C. THE STRATEGY’S OPPORTUNITY 
The NSS is a manifold of perspectives; it is not without bias and partiality in its 
categories and concepts. The NSS is unbalanced. Its identifications of actors (the “us-
self” and “others”) are made with varying degrees of specificity; and, in some cases, the 
“others” evoked are almost ephemeral—an unknown danger that lurks over the horizon. 
The geopolitical and ideological horizons of the NSS are vague; while the NSS speaks of 
the change it seeks in the world, it neglects discussion of the intermediaries and “middle 
ground” it must engage in order to realize those horizons. No matter how one proceeds to 
deconstruct the NSS, a strong argument may be made that the remnants of the 
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disassembled strategy remain salient and significant if only by virtue of their having been 
included in the document. Rather than extending a debate as to what the NSS is or is not, 
or what it should be, let us pose a different question: what could it be? 
The NSS presents a strategy for a nation-state, the United States. The United 
States is not monolithic or unitary: it exists as a body of diverse peoples, a state of laws 
operating within specific geographic territories, a collection of economic, social, and 
scientific potentials, and as an idea. At multiple levels, the United States has interests, 
goals and desires toward which it intends to proceed. The United States exists as but one 
actor within a much larger world, but the long shadow of its presence and influence falls 
across the globe. Frequently, the United States acts not alone, but as part of a larger body 
that includes also its allies and partners. But, the United States is opposed. Resistance and 
threat emerge in the world from several points of attack: from within, from virtual 
realities, from dangerous ideologies of “the others,” and from the changing nature of the 
international order in which it is reified as a nation-state; and, most importantly, the 
United States of the NSS evidently does not understand what drives the behavior of the 
other actors in its environment, as the NSS leaves aside any concrete discussion of what 
motivates these other actors or why they tend to pursue specific objectives.  
An opportunity, then, for the NSS is to take up the challenge of explaining and 
describing its world. The NSS could begin by describing the world in terms of how 
constituent actors relate to each other instead of merely in terms of how they relate to the 
United States; this would enhance the strategy’s ability to deal with the identity of the 
actors in its world. Further, it could provide some logic of behavior for these actors by 
venturing, even if boldly or presumptively, to make claims about why these other actors 
do what they do; this could be done in terms of innate motivations without resorting to 
the explanatory capacity of the external stressors which the 2015 NSS relies upon and 
which paint actors as victims of their circumstances. Lastly, the NSS could be more 
scalable and consistent by not privileging any particular type of actor with special rules or 
capabilities. Such an NSS could deal with states, sub-state actors, and individuals as 
discrete points along a continuum of actor identity which behave in ways motivated by a 
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consistent logic and purpose, and none of which are privileged by virtue of their typology 
or association with or opposition to the subject “United States” of the strategy. 
D. EMERGENCE OF AN IDEAL STRATEGY 
If the NSS is to be the lion in William Blake’s analogy, it must look to others of 
its kind for guidance. A first step in that regard is to recognize that the NSS is, and has 
been, something other than what it could be. Second, a suitable analog for what the NSS 
should be must be found—or constructed. “Strategy,” Yarger says, “seeks a synergy and 
symmetry of objectives, concepts, and resources to increase the probability of policy 
success and the favorable consequences that follow from that success.”75 Realizing 
“synergy” and “symmetry” in these areas, which the NSS evidently lacks, might 
represent a potential zenith of what the NSS could be, an “ideal.” The NSS should be able 
to account for the motivations of a wide range of actors using a consistent logic for their 
behavior that does not invoke exceptions for some and different rules for others. It should 
allow articulation of objectives and desires with logic other than the invocation of self-
referential identity—the NSS should be able to explain why it seeks certain outcomes 
employing reasons other than, merely, a tautological assertion that “we want these things 
because this is who we are.” Based on the observations made thus far, it is possible to 
articulate a set of conceptual necessities that an “ideal” national security strategy might 
embody.  
If the NSS is to reify a conceptual model of the world, then it must enjoy certain 
features of a sound conceptual model—namely, an ontological foundation and 
epistemological extensions. A suitable ontology must be derived with due consideration 
of how the world is experienced and engaged with by a perceiving observer inhabiting 
that world. “Creating [conceptual] models of reality for the purpose of understanding and 
communication,” note Guarino and Guizzardi, “should commit to a foundational theory 
that, albeit ontological, takes human language and cognition seriously.”76 Further, we 
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may read “language” here in the broadest semiotic-discursive sense. The conceptual 
model should provide for the existence of things to be modeled, the establishment of 
those things as discrete entities, and account for a superordinate and derived 
understanding of those things, the latter of these three also necessarily being a pluralistic 
understanding. These requirements are essentially analogous to Charles Peirce’s three 
semiotic categories of human understanding: “the idea that reality is comprised of three 
stuffs: lone quality, causal impacts between two things, and triadic relations (that have 
the power to beget more of themselves).”77 In the first of these we have the abstract-
theoretical establishment of substance—a one-dimension that Peirce called a “world.”78 
Secondly, we find interaction, an invisible (two-dimensional) relation between two 
monads with each acting on the other imperceptibly in a manner somewhat analogous to 
the “hidden machinery” alluded to by the Apostle Paul in I Corinthians. Thirdly, we find 
thinking, doing, and understanding—cognition and purposeful action in a three-
dimensional79 world—in the evident construction of a reality that is perceived by an 
observer who is also a constituent and participant of that reality. 
If we take Peirce’s categories as a framework for stripping bare the fundamental 
nature of a conceived reality we may then postulate the requirements of an ideal strategy 
as a conceptual model of reality in terms of those categories. First, an ideal strategy must 
account for the substance its world: discernable actors with specific identities. Identities 
are variable depending upon observer perspective and may occur along a continuum of 
actors ranging from individuals to states and multi-national institutions. In the abstract, 
identity is a function of differentiating actors in an environment; further, there is no 
reason to presuppose that actors in that environment will be limited to humans or to 
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human constructions, nor that those actors pre-exist their differentiation by an observer.80 
Concerns along these lines include: how individuals construct personal identity; social, 
group, and cultural identity; and, within the latter, organizational and institutional 
identity, such as with states and trans-national/inter-national entities. Atop groups of 
individual actors, the ideal strategy must allow for the perception of both hierarchies and 
networks and for translation between the two. It must also account for interaction with 
non-human actors, i.e., the natural world. 
Second, an ideal strategy must provide a model of behavior. From the perspective 
of the voice speaking in the strategy, an understanding of behavior should be sufficiently 
predictive as to allow the achievement of aims, maximizing expected utility within the 
limits of its theoretical complexity and its ability to accurately model the reality 
envisioned by the strategy. This implies that an ideal model must offer a method for 
determining whether behavior has occurred—i.e., what qualifies as behavior—as well as 
an understanding of what motivates behavior. 
Third, an ideal strategy must accommodate multiple levels of analysis and 
description. Building upon actor identity and behavior, an ideal strategy must also 
account for various and shifting levels of analysis in terms of actors, groups of actors, and 
the interfaces between them. Insofar as this entails assigning actors to arbitrary categories 
using conceptual labels, an ideal strategy should also facilitate rigorous definition of 
these categories. It must maintain consistency with the first and second requirements, 
above, when used for analytical purposes; identity and behavior should be understood 
uniformly across the environment, regardless of which actor is presented as an analysand.  
In other words, an ideal strategy must present an understanding of a world of 
moving parts that are all connected to each other. The actors in that world must be readily 
identified, discriminated among, and animated, regardless of their arbitrary 
categorization. Such an ideal strategy should survey a landscape of men and nations and 
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be able to interact with and make predictions about itself and these “others” utilizing a 
single, consistent logic that holds within the particular strategic reality being 




Table 3. Elements of an Ideal Strategy 
Element Criterion/Description 
1 
Handling of Actor Identity 
- Accounts for actor identity as understood from multiple perspectives 
simultaneously (self, others, group and social identity). 
- Accounts for interconnectedness of actors. 
- Accounts for shifting hierarchical and rank-ordered factors of actor identity 
subscription (self-categorization) without sacrificing focus on the analysis of 
interest. 
2 
Model of Actor Behavior 
- Provides a framework for accurately predicting actor behavior given the 
limitations of available information. 
- Differentiates intentional behavior from non-behavior/passive reactions; stated 




- Allows actors to be grouped/described using arbitrary categories without 
sacrificing precision; i.e., accounts for all possible combinations of actors in 
any given descriptive set. 
- Allows actor and groups of actors to be described with a level of detail chosen 
by the analyst; i.e., does not arbitrarily limit the analyst to any specific 
categories or sets. 
 
The implications of such a formulation cannot be overstated. In such a model, 
both the strategy and the “others” it constructs must be motivated by a common 
mechanism. All corners of its reality must be accessible from a single vantage point. It 
must be, within the constraints of its own reality’s complexity, an accurate representation: 
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IV. ILLUMINATING STRATEGOS 
If theory is helpful, it emerges from the oppressed. 
 
— Gene Outka and John Reeder,  
Prospects for a Common Morality 
 
A. A VIABLE STRATEGY 
Strategy, as Yarger describes it, “is a process that seeks to apply a degree of 
rationality and linearity to circumstances that may or may not be either. Strategy though 
complex accomplishes this by expressing its logic in rational, linear terms—simply 
identified as ends, ways, and means.”81 Yarger continues: 
Understanding the nature of the strategic environment and a theory of 
strategy allows us to grasp and work with its complexity by understanding 
its logic. A theory of strategy provides: essential terminology and 
definitions; explanations of the underlying assumptions and premises; 
substantive propositions translated into testable hypotheses; and methods 
that can be used to test hypotheses and modify the theory as appropriate.82 
Strategy must maintain integrity in its categories and concepts; and, more directly, 
an observer or thinking “strategist” engaged in “understanding … the strategic 
environment” using a “theory of strategy” must be equipped with the complete and self-
compatible toolset that Yarger proposes. In order for us to proceed, we must problematize 
this assertion and expose the foundations underlying this process. First, observe that 
strategy, in a sense, may be understood as an agent which perceives an environment; i.e., 
strategy may be anthropomorphized. Thus, strategy not only represents an assemblage of 
static features but also reifies a world in which the strategy and its implicit constructs 
exist. Second, insofar as strategy’s world exists and strategy perceives its world, that 
world must consist of discernable components; the world of strategy can exist only in the 
confines of an underlying ontology. Finally, for strategy to be anything other than merely 
an inanimate discourse—a history or fantasy, if you will—it must also know its world; 
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this knowledge, ultimately contextual, provides strategy with the epistemology needed to 
make sense of its world. Epistemology also provides for strategy’s ability to overcome 
complexity in an animated world where perception is regulated and facilitated by an 
actively perceiving observer, a strategic agent: the Strategos.83 Particulars may be 
interchanged and reconfigured through the mechanisms of epistemology that are 
anchored in an underlying, common and consistent ontology. As Heider observed 
regarding ethnographic studies, the implication of such a framework is that “there is a 
shared reality, true, but differing truths may indeed be said about it.”84 In this sense, 
ontology refers to whatever is consistent about a world (observer-independent) while 
epistemology refers to all that varies through the hermeneutics of specific observers 
operating within that world. Thus, we are in want of a framework that allows us to 
account not only for what the strategic reality is—its parts and constituents—but also for 
how both Strategos and the various other actors in that world see and understand each 
other. To answer this need, we may turn to social science and its literature, which 
provides us with the terminology, specificity, and integrity Yarger encourages us to seek. 
It is important to note that there is an absence of literature conceptualizing 
strategy as an exercise in ontology.85 There is, however, extensive literature regarding the 
epistemological implications of strategy.86 Strategic thought, in a conventional sense, 
may be described as the ability to identify and exploit epistemological “gaps” between 
oneself and his opponents. This is a separate concern entirely from ontology, however: 
understanding and exploiting inconsistency in the meanings of things is a different 
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concern entirely from crafting more useful models for the representation of what things 
“are.” Therefore, we are presented with two inextricable points of inquiry: 
(1) How to construct an ontology within which the Strategos may exist in 
concert with a broader, conceptualized world; and, 
(2) How to equip the Strategos with the knowledge needed to interact with 
that world. 
To meet these ontological and epistemological requirements, we must engage a 
broad literature through the lens of the certain concerns that differentiate “strategy” from 
other conceptual models of reality, specifically the features of an “ideal strategy” as 
presented in Chapter III.D, Emergence of an Ideal Strategy: 
(1) A robust model of identity that accounts for both networked and 
hierarchical organization of discrete actors; 
(2) A predictive and descriptive model of behavior; and, 
(3) Analytical integrity and translatability of identity and behavior 
implications across the full spectrum of possible actor categorizations.87 
Strategy is not philosophy. It is less concerned with truth than with utility. In 
purely pragmatismic terms, the NSS, for example, is an ineluctable reflection of the real 
world—it was written by real people for real purposes. While the NSS certainly deals 
with man and the state, these two do not constitute the whole continuum of actors that it 
imagines. States, in a sense, may be surpassed by multi-state coalitions and international 
institutions. The NSS also conceptualizes non-corporeal threats among its actors, some of 
which are “within” man—for instance, the ideologies of violent extremism, malign 
resistance and subversive alternatives to the international system of states, and so forth. 
All of these actors are entangled within a securitizing logic of opposition: the intent of 
strategy is not to know the world, but to survive it. Survival, in this sense, may be 
described as whatever ultimate goal toward which the strategic agent intends, regardless 
of whether the agent is cognizant of such a trajectory or end-state. The relationship 
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between behavior and survival is central to strategy. Survival is an enterprise of 
interaction: resources are consumed and decisions calculated. To elucidate the three 
criteria of ideal strategy set forth, an investigation of how actors, such as those presented 
in the NSS, survive—how they behave—is needed. 
B. APPROACHING A STRATEGIC REALITY 
1. Order amidst Chaos 
a. Constructing the State of Man 
Why do states behave in particular ways? Three mainstream theories of 
international relations seek to answer this question and to explain its corollaries: 
structural realism, neoliberal institutionalism, and social constructivism. The differences 
in these theories are succinctly summed up by Hopf: “structural realism focuses on power 
relations, neoliberal institutionalism bases its analysis on constellations of interests, and 
constructivism emphasizes knowledge dynamics, communication, and identities.”88 In 
essence, realism holds that states behave in particular ways because they are states and 
because they co-exist with each other in an environment of anarchy. Realism is a zero-
sum theory of relative advantage. Realism imagines power as something derived from an 
imbalance between entities in opposition, each of which always seeks to maintain a 
superior position relative to its peers. On the other hand, institutionalism imagines the 
state as interested in absolute gains that are not necessarily obtained at the expense of 
other states.89 Institutionalism has evolved from a theory which initially explained 
behavior as the mechanistic output of social systems and rules (the “institutions” which 
are the namesake of the theory) to one that accounts for the deterministic role of 
discourse—within and without a state—on state behavior.90 Stated succinctly, discursive 
institutionalism holds that state behavior is driven by values and ideas in a constant state 
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of evolution and refinement. While these ideas and values are in constant flux, they 
nonetheless hold meaning only within the shared discourse, preventing a scenario of 
realist relativism.91 Institutionalism posits that states, as well as the international 
institutions and other multinational and regional geopolitical arrangements, engage in an 
ongoing dialogue through which goals are continually defined and coalitions are built. 
Among international relations theories, social constructivism is noted for lacking 
a standardized conception of agency along the individual-group continuum—in this 
sense, constructivism has been said to lack an engine of power and politics to animate its 
predictions and to suffer from a “methodological flabbiness.”92 Constructivism provides 
useful explanations and analytical tools for examining the context about how and why 
events occur in retrospect, but it fails to provide a predictive methodology. Noting this 
discrepancy, some writers focus on augmenting the constructivist tool kit with ideas and 
analytical methods drawn from other traditional international relations schools of 
thought.93 Whatever these “bolt-on” enhancements to constructivism may add in 
analytical utility is overshadowed by their reliance on often contrary theoretical 
lineages—a reliance that weakens the promising theoretical foundations of 
constructivism by attempting to patch or bridge areas of opportunity using reflectionist 
models rather than by seeking to extend the theoretical bases and milieux of 
constructivism itself. Essentially, constructivism speaks in a language of states as 
persons.94 This line of argument proceeds from an assumption that, while states are 
clearly not persons, they are constructed of persons, and states may exhibit characteristics 
of persons such as behavior (i.e., discursive behavior), constructed reality, and identity. In 
such a model, identity and behavior are inextricably linked to each other: who or what 
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states are is, to a great degree, a function of what they do—how they interact with the 
word.95  
Drawing from social theory and organizational theory, Legro proposes a model 
for identity change that rests upon the introduction of what might be termed a “viable 
alternative” to a society’s current practices and beliefs.96 In Legro’s model, identity 
change occurs when “expectations of related policy ideas are defied by events, negative 
consequences result, and some socially viable replacement idea exists and meets 
expectations.”97 The model arises from the assumption that extant policies and practices 
in a society are dominant because they are expected to produce—or have historically 
produced—certain predictable results. Change may occur when these policy and practice 
expectations cease to reflect real-world events—i.e., when current practice fails to 
produce desirable results and the cost of continuing the present course outweighs the 
costs incurred by policy change. The concept of social viability is crucial, as any 
alternative to or replacement for current policy and practice must satisfy the foundational 
requirements and preferences of the current identity. Within any particular social frame, 
however defined, courses of actions or “alternatives” will be weighed for viability in 
context of the specific opportunities and limitations of that particular frame; i.e., it does 
not hold that, in any given situation, a viable solution for Group A is also necessarily a 
viable solution for Group B, absent other extenuating factors and qualifiers. While the 
analytical frames may be arbitrary, specified rules and conventions may nonetheless be 
held to apply within those frames. 
In Legro’s model, some “negative consequences” to the status quo must exist in 
order for an alternative to that status quo to be adopted—that is, there must be a salient 
impetus for change that can be attributed to insufficiency of the status quo. These 
negative consequences must clearly outweigh (or, through political discourse, be 
successfully attributed to) the consequences of maintaining status quo. Thus, a state’s 
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identity is understood to be “plastic,” as policy paradigms only occasionally change 
despite being buffeted by continuous fluctuations in the environment. In this light, 
Legro’s model may be understood as a tolerance model rather than exclusively as a 
change model. One way of observing such a shift from a state of tolerance to one of 
change is in the ongoing discourse concerning problems, solutions, and politics in a 
society; in order for “viable alternatives” to take hold, some level of blame must be fixed 
on an identifiable agent responsible for the less-than-optimal prior state of affairs.98  
As political actors engage in discourse intended toward policy change, Subotić 
argues that they operate within—and construct—contextual narratives that are relevant to 
their constituencies and peers. Each state, like cultures and other identity groups, has 
identity insofar as there exists shared meaning about what the state “is” and where it 
came from—its founding narrative.99 Founding narratives provide ontological security 
for a state’s citizens by providing a framework within which citizens understand 
themselves—that is, how they embody their identities—as citizens of the state.  
Identity and meaning constrain the field of discourse for politicians, but also 
facilitate the creative manipulation of key themes to further political ends by helping a 
political actor convey information in a manner intended to garner support. When engaged 
in political discourse and rhetoric, a politician may employ a narrative “that emphasizes 
some parts of the story and conveniently forgets others.”100 Insofar as politicians are, by 
definition, representative of a particular constituency, their narrative innovation is 
limited—they operate “within a dense normative social environment that constitutes their 
preferences and choices.”101 Within that environment, shared memories—shared 
narratives—of past political measures and their outcomes are constitutive of national 
identity and limit future policy options in that “national identity” must be preserved in 
order for policy options to be viable, thus limiting the field of possible courses of action. 
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The implication of such an interpretation as presented here is that states represent 
a complex and ordered system. They are only an arbitrary level, or category, of what 
might be more precisely termed a “society.” States, just like any other social group, are 
constructed of men and all the socially-constructed baggage they bring along; states are 
not monolithic or privileged as political constructs. Interactions—changes in behavior—
like the alteration of policy and perpetual iteration of political discourse are driven 
toward an expected utility, but are also limited by shared and contested understandings of 
identity. More so, they are limited by their fundament: the ordered construction of the 
society in which those interactions take place. 
b. Assault from beyond the Pale 
What might happen, then, when the behavior of a complex, ordered, and 
constructed society (such as, in this example, a state, but which may also be a tribe, an 
organization, or any other social group) becomes intolerable to man—in the abstract, to 
an actor existing wholly outside the self-constituting reality in which that society may be 
said to exist? More accurately, what label would be given to this kind of behavior—
behavior that would be totally untenable within the limitations implicit in the society’s 
construct—something utterly in affront to the very notion of that constructed, ordered, 
complex society? Any reaction (or, simply, interaction) that is not completely antithetical 
to the ordered reality of that society would, of course, be considered normative within the 
ordered reality of that society. As a label for this other kind of behavior that comes from a 
place beyond the frontier of tenable rationality and logical resolvability, one word comes 
to mind: terrorism.102  
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, much academic focus was 
shifted to the study of terrorism, with much research focusing on terrorism as a problem 
to be solved.103 In this context of exigency, de la Roche argues from a sociological 
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perspective that a theory of terrorism must hold five key features: “simplicity (economy 
of language); generality (applicability to the largest possible range of cases); testability 
(capable of being contradicted by observations); validity (conformity to the facts); and 
originality (unlike anything previously known).”104 This last proposition is interesting 
insofar as it may indicate the emergence of what has been termed “the new terrorism” of 
the modern epoch. It may be argued, however, that the “essentially modern” features 
often ascribed to terrorism are “inessential features” to a rigorous discussion of the 
epiphenomenon.105  
Cameron and Goldstein point out that specific concerns such as globalization and 
religious ideology are symptomatic, but not diagnostic, of modern terrorism’s 
phenomenology—that is, terrorism is not simply “about globalization” nor “about 
ideology.” These authors, however, do tend toward a description of terrorism that evokes 
a progressive pathway of cognitive dissonance, social revolutionary intent, violence, and, 
ultimately, death—a view which privileges terrorism as a phenomenon rooted in 
modernity: a decidedly structuralist (i.e., modern) approach. In a more specific 
application of a similar, but methodologically distinct, argument, the concept of a “new 
terrorism” in the context of a post-September 11, 2001 environment has been 
discredited.106 
Generally speaking, schools of terrorism studies focus on either of two concerns: 
what terrorism means (sociology, psychology, and political science) or what terrorism 
does (strategies and tactics). The camps of this dichotomy may be condensed 
thematically: social/psychological studies are devoted to understanding and explaining 
why terrorism and its related phenomena occur; and, realist/pragmatist approaches to the 
phenomenology of terror take its causality de facto and focus instead on studying ways to 
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identify, control, or manage it. The received theories of terrorism provide approaches of 
psychology and psychopathy, social identity theory/social categorization theory, social 
conflict theory, collective violence, and communications theory, among other 
approaches. 
Among the issues on which the received theories have historically offered 
different opinions and debate are the following: 
(1) Whether terrorism is essentially a group phenomenon. For example, can 
an individual acting alone be considered a terrorist? To what extent are 
“parent cultures” to be held responsible when their members perpetrate 
acts of terrorism? Does ideology or culture generate terrorism or might 
terrorism arise within any given ideology or culture? 
(2) Whether the essence of terrorism lies in the act itself, or in the 
communicative activity/effect of the act. Is a targeted assassination an act 
of terrorism? Is the purpose of terrorism to kill and degrade the enemy or 
to coerce and intimidate an audience? 
(3) Whether asymmetry of capability between terrorist and target is a defining 
feature. Does a fight between terrorist groups represent terrorism? 
(4) Whether terrorism can be perpetrated by a government/nation-state. What 
is the difference between terrorism and war? How do ethical and legal 
frameworks sometimes justify war but not terrorism? 
(5) Whether the cause of terrorism lies in the individual or in the social. What 
are the root causes of terrorism? Are terrorists mentally ill? Can social 
engineering be used to “counter violent extremism?” Can terrorists be 
systematically “de-radicalized” and reintegrated into society? 
An example of this uncertainty may be found in Crenshaw’s analysis of two 
competing viewpoints: instrumentalism versus organizational theory.107 In the 
instrumental approach, terrorism is seen as a means to an eventual end. Terrorism is 
about violence and conflict in an attempt to influence or overcome an adversary: a central 
future goal is posited for the terrorist endeavor and the apparatus of terrorism deployed to 
achieve realization of that goal. As goals may be very difficult to obtain, various 
strategies might be employed to bring about attainment of the goal in a series of 
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escalating strategic choices. In contrast, organizational theory posits that terrorism is a 
phenomenon in-and-of itself. The goal of terrorists in this mode of theory is to perpetuate 
their organizations and to elevate their own status within those organizations. Such a 
view posits that terrorist organizations will take measures to retain and recruit members 
such as preventing group member exit and taking extreme measures to ensure loyalty to 
the group. Along the lines of these concerns, Crenshaw notes, terrorist organizations 
based around ideology might find common ground with the phenomenon of a cult. In her 
words, “the motivation for terrorism may be to transcend reality as much as to transform 
it.”108 
From an emic perspective, terrorism has been described as a meaning-making 
activity that gives “terrorists a sense of meaning or purpose in life.”109 From the etic 
perspective, terrorism is described as “a decentralized, complex, [and] evolutionary 
process,” that does not lend itself to being countered through conventional (kinetic) 
military means alone.110 This should not imply that so-called “terrorists” are any more or 
less vulnerable to death—kinetic intervention—than any other humans; rather, it serves to 
remind us that—at least, in Western, liberal societies—many restrictions operate to limit 
the range of possible courses-of-action available for dealing with terrorists and their 
organizations, and such options range from ignoring it altogether, to military intervention, 
and onward to complex social and political interventions such as “countering violent 
extremism” and “exporting democracy.” 
Terrorism is a phenomenon of human interaction with—and within—political 
orders. As such, analysts and strategists are necessarily limited in their engagement with 
terrorism by utilizing existing theoretical frames to discuss the phenomenon. Theoretical 
frames are co-opted by institutions and political actors to varying effect. For instance, 
terrorism, to the military, may be viewed primarily as a tactic to be thwarted, and so be 
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dealt with using frameworks of counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency military 
operations. For social theorists, terrorism embodies a deviation from normative social 
interaction, and thus may be dealt with in terms of an actor’s rebellion against a dominant 
or threatening social order. For analysts writing in advocacy of citizens’ points-of-view, 
terrorism may be understood as a securitized issue exploited by government actors to 
dominate and control populations both domestically and abroad.111 As terrorism is 
relevant to everyone, everyone appears entitled to an opinion about what terrorism means 
and how it should best be controlled—or employed. 
Critical theory and phenomenology may hold promise for analysts in this regard. 
In these constructs, the adage “perception is reality” is held as axiomatic. All experience 
is understood to be discursive. Human actors construct their realities through 
differentiation—instantiation—of other actors against themselves and so construct a 
milieu of perceived actors.112 What people want is a function of what people perceive 
they could be. This should not be understood in a literal sense of what is possible in the 
perceived reality of the external world—rather, the construction holds for both real 
experience of the actor that remains temporally tuned to the (psychological) present of 
the external world environment as well as for imagined environments not necessarily 
tuned to experiential reality. All realized and cognized human activity takes place within 
the bounds of a discursively perceived reality. The environment perceived by a human 
includes other actors: the natural world, animals, plants, and other humans. As a person 
observes other humans interacting with this (his) environment, meanings are learned 
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derivatively, through observation and example in interpretation of observation; in this 
sense, perception of reality is said to be socially constructed.113 
Take, for instance, Morris and Crank’s suggestion of various means through 
which phenomenology might be useful to terrorism studies, which centers on two 
premises: first, that terrorism tends to be defined in terms of organizational raisons 
d’être—i.e., organizations (bureaucratic, nation-states, groups of individuals) may be 
described as “related” or “not related” to terrorism, thus necessitating actors (individual 
or otherwise) to define their identities in relation to “terrorism;” and, second, that the 
phenomena of terrorism and counter-terrorism inevitably invoke securitizing discourse 
which tends to limit analytical objectivity.114 Another example is found in Teschner who 
argues that terrorism represents a case of alterity conflict between mutually irreconcilable 
“singularities”—such as a state and the terrorists it combats.115  
In addressing the ethics of terrorism, Smith uses phenomenological frames, first 
observing that terrorism may be understood as a “transgressive spectacle,” or, in other 
words, a violation of the normative principles of violent conflict.116 He also posits the 
role of ideology in the form of what he calls “existential values,” noting that terrorism is 
not merely a rejection of norms, but also an expression of “positive commitment to a 
certain set of values”—in other words, terrorism is a speech act.117 Smith’s observation 
that “the phenomenology of terrorism is the fear of moral annihilation” is perhaps most 
salient in that his concept of terrorist conflict in this regard may also be understood as a 
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conflict of competing modes of governmentality. Further, in discussion of what he terms 
the “ethical singularity,” Smith points out that the terrorist’s moral judgment is not 
necessarily wrong but that it is instead utterly incompatible with the systems of moral 
judgement of those who would find fault with it—in this sense, ethical conflict is 
irreconcilable insofar as the terrorist’s ethical hermeneutic is purely subjective.  
2. An Identity Crisis 
a. A Face in the Mirror 
Smith’s argument that phenomenological frames matter may lend itself to 
employment as an adjunct to social psychological theories of terrorism in its recognition 
of the important role of actor messaging to in-group peers. A question remains, though, 
as to whether terrorist conflict may be explained without necessitating the use of generic 
devices such as irreconcilability and closed systems of morality and ethics. Smith argues 
that in terroristic conflicts, the parties “both see the other as committed to ethical 
singularities, and so both will likely see the violence committed by the other as 
terroristic.”118 This assertion unnecessarily reduces the problem space in its presumption 
that the “root of conflict” (the mutual incompatibility of competing ethical singularities) 
would be mutually construed.119  
Within the bounds of perceived reality, politics exists as a categorical subset of 
the whole spectrum of human activity. Normative political systems function as 
frameworks that govern the deployment and operation of power within particular social 
constructs. The existence and function of such normative systems is embodied in the 
Foucauldian concept of governmentality. Governmentality refers to the employment of 
what may be termed “political technologies” within a particular socio-cultural context to 
a desired end—that is to say the regulatory action of the various mechanisms through 
which power is exercised in a particular social context.120 While many understand 
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governmentality to be primarily associated with a state’s relationship with its subjects, 
such a reading is unnecessarily narrow. Governmentality is exemplified throughout the 
spectrum of social power relationships such as those that exist between patron/client, 
subject/state, elder/minor, rich/poor, husband/wife, and child/parent.121 Governmentality 
achieves through operation of power what social psychology achieves through the roles 
of social categorization processes and identity theory: the regulation of the social space. 
Terrorism is understood as an epiphenomenon in that it both arises from and 
occurs within a field of normative human social interaction. Events which may be labeled 
“terrorism,” like all human endeavors, may be understood as artifacts of the alchemy of 
power; any conceivable circumstance which may be exploited by an actor embodies a 
relation of power.122 The conditionality of this proposition is emphasized in that power is 
reified in the mere possibility of its operation, but such a possibility must first be 
conceived by an actor. The terrorist undertakes to create a relation between himself and 
others which he may exploit to accumulate power. It is the existence of this “exploitable 
relation” that implies “power.”123 In this line of thought, terrorism is not necessarily 
bound to any particular social structure or “order.” The actor innovates affordance 
relations against a deterministic background of understanding: the episteme.124 The 
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episteme bounds the realm of conceivableness for the actor—in other words, it represents 
the fundamental matrix through which an actor may know and which limits what may be 
known by the actor. Moreover, the episteme is socially constructed—its experience is 
implicit in the consciousness of the actor, and it is not something that is created 
deliberatively by the actor. The episteme is not static—it is continually enacted. In short, 
terrorism can only be said to occur within an episteme in which an affordance relation 
supporting terrorism is feasible. Such an episteme also bounds any conceivable targets of 
the terrorist’s endeavor. Thus, the target and the terrorist are, in a sense, mutually 
constitutive.  
The nature of power is itself a subject of inquiry. I argue that power is, simply, 
that which affords agency to an actor.125 Just as the resistance of the earth beneath one’s 
feet allows him to push upwards against the force of gravity, the various deployments 
(which Foucault terms dispositifs) of power within a society afford its actors a foundation 
upon which their lives (as action) may ensue. Power does not only exist between actors, 
but it also exists within them—that is to say, actors themselves are constitutive of 
power.126  Rosa Luxemburg’s observation on revolt, that “Freedom is always and 
exclusively freedom for the one who thinks differently,” is salient.127 Insofar as actors 
are constitutive of power, these actors are also beholden to the dispositifs through which 
their (the actors’) power relations are realized—or, stated differently, through which 
actors’ achievement of a desired state of power relations may be frustrated. 
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To illustrate this point of view, consider, for instance, Sartre’s example of the 
slave who, in deciding whether to break his chains (which he may freely do), experiences 
an essentially unique and subjective dilemma which cannot be stated in objective terms. 
While the slave may be said to be internally free (perhaps in the Stoic sense), his 
functional freedom—the range and potential effectiveness of possible (future) actions 
within this particular dispositif available to help the slave realize a life of “freedom”—is 
both limited and defined by his bondage.128 Further, the reification of the life-threatening 
danger posed by circumstance of his slavery will only come to pass in the event the slave 
decides to revolt.  
Three important points for discussion are noted in this illustration. First, the slave 
“must choose himself on the ground of slavery and give meaning to this obscure 
constraint” (emphasis added)—that is, his agency is uniquely his own in both his 
ownership of the agency and in its construction within his personal experience of 
reality.129 Secondly, any action taken is of necessity a meaning-making activity. Lastly, 
he has always in mind the possibility of alternate futures. Only the slave can make the 
determination whether to risk his life or to endure bondage, and deciding either way will 
define who he is and who he will become. Freedom is “not only the right to do or be, but 
also the actual capability to do or be” (emphasis added).130 The essence of such an 
argument is that all experience implies experience of power relationships, and that those 
relationships are necessarily subjective in nature. Man is not only what he thinks, but also 
what he does, a concept relayed by Sartre thus: 
Therefore the cause, far from determining the action, appears only in and 
through the project of an action. It is in and through the project of 
imposing his rule on all of Gaul that the state of the Western Church 
appears objectively to Clovis as a cause for his conversion. In other words 
the consciousness which carves out the cause in the ensemble of the world 
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has already its own structure; it has given its own ends to itself, it has 
projected itself toward its possibles, and it has its own manner of hanging 
on to its possibilities: this peculiar manner of holding to its possibles is 
here affectivity.131 
This proposition that views power as reified only in action has become known as 
“Latour’s paradox”: “No matter how much power one accumulates, it is always necessary 
to obtain it from the others who are doing the action—this is what I called the shift from 
diffusion to translation.”132 Power is not collected, it is connected—or, more precisely, 
power is what makes connectedness visible. It is not a commodity in the sense of 
something that may be moved around—it is the relational topology through which things 
move. 
As power always exists in relational states, any shift in power implies a 
reconfiguration of other power relations (either absolutely [zero-sum] or relatively 
[relative increase/decrease]). Thus, power is not understood just as the measurable, 
relative accrual of an abstract resource, but rather it may also be construed the ebb and 
flow of an intangible field of possibilities with varying volume (multiplicity), speed 
(temporal position relative to the present), and resistance (feasibility). In fact, objective 
assessment of an actor’s power reveals the plasticity of power—it is, in a sense, “sticky,” 
in that power transfers or shifts invoke distributed analysis on the part of a transaction’s 
affected parties as to how they conceptualize the deployment of power in the pre-, trans- 
and post-transaction scenarios—with the effect that actors must be certain, to a degree, of 
how a shift in power will affect them prior to actively participating in a power transition. 
These concepts are illustrated by Legro’s argument that change in social policies rests 
upon collective evaluation of the viability of alternative policy arrangements (pre-change) 
and the efficacy of new policy arrangements (post-change)—and, insofar as actor 
identities are constituted by power, this line of argument is consistent with the 
                                                 
131 Italics added. Sartre and Barnes, Being and Nothingness, 448. 
132 Bruno Latour, “The Powers of Association,” The Sociological Review 32 (May 1, 1984): 276, 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-954X.1984.tb00115.x. Also, see the discussion in Jonathan Gaventa, “Power after 
Lukes: An Overview of Theories of Power since Lukes and Their Application to Development,” 
Typescript, Brighton: Participation Group, Institute of Development Studies, 2003, 
http://www.powercube.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/power_after_lukes.pdf. 
 69 
proposition that power changes are moderated by the plasticity of the networks being 
changed.133 Clearly delineating the separate identities of actors involved in conflict, 
however, is problematic. If the power relations between these actors are mutually 
constitutive, how can one divide, say, the terrorist from the terrorized? 
b. Dissolving Identity 
Terrorism works as a phenomenon because its agents and targets are caught up in 
a state of affairs that affords terrorism the possibility of operation. If the activity observed 
in terrorism implies that the terrorist and the target are inextricably bound in a web of 
power and contest, then a question emerges as to exactly how one might neatly define the 
“identity” of any actor in that reality. Identity of an actor should not be confused with 
identification of an actor—that is, identifying the status of “United States of America” as 
a state, organization, or institution is not the same as understanding the “identity” of the 
U.S. as a particular entity. Additionally, identification is distinct from identity in that the 
former may be understood in terms of overt interests and capabilities without 
necessitating the nuance of an in-grained or self-conscious “identity” that drives 
behavior; identification may be tautological, while identity cannot but be unique. 
Regarding this latter concept, two salient theories are social identity theory and 
identity theory, which both imagine an actor who constitutes his identity through social 
relations. Social identity theory provides a model in which an individual’s identity is 
understood as a function of how an individual perceives his membership—or lack 
thereof—in social groups (more generally referred to as categories).134 Social identity 
theory, which bears resemblance to identity theory as discussed below, differs from the 
latter in its conceptualization of identity salience.135 A central premise of social identity 
theory is that actors engage in an ongoing process of self-categorization, in which the self 
is examined as either similar (in-group) or dissimilar (out-group) to others. Self-
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categorization thus enables a second-order process of comparison in which an actor tends 
to emphasize similarities between himself and his in-groups while simultaneously 
emphasizing differences between himself and his out-groups. In such a comparison, 
positively evaluating the in-group as compared to the out-group affords an actor the 
ability to maintain self-esteem. Affectively, an actor’s self-esteem is understood to stem 
from how he perceives the relative advantage or disadvantage of in-groups versus out-
groups.  
Underlying both the categorization and comparison processes is the actor’s 
perception of social categories. It is the salience of these categories that drives behavior, 
and any conceivable difference between an in-group and an out-group can cause an actor 
to act in a manner that seeks to reify the relative advantage of his in-group over the out-
group; and, as demonstrated in a variation of Tajfel’s minimal group experiment, salience 
of relative power may itself be a pre-condition for salience of differential categories to 
impact behavior.136 Even when no out-group may be readily salient (as when an agent 
acts in solitude), the social categorization process is theorized to be responsible for affect 
management in a relativistic manner, as the self may been seen to exist as a category of 
“one” in juxtaposition against conceptualized “others.” Agency, in social identity theory, 
may thus be stated as the desire to maintain a positive self-evaluation (a positive 
understanding of one’s own identity) contra perceived out-groups.  
In contrast to social identity theory, identity theory provides a model in which an 
understanding of individual identity rests upon the centrality of an actor’s active and 
continual awareness, subscription to, and modeling of social roles. Identity theory posits 
that role-based identities become salient when an actor perceives a situation as not 
conforming to internalized role standards, thus driving behavior—the process known in 
identity theory as “self-verification.”137 Actions performed by an actor may be seen by an 
outside observer as either verifying or invalidating the role standards prevalent in a 
particular social group. Identity theory, as summarized by Stryker and Burke, holds that 
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an actor’s behavior is “goal-directed” in that it “changes the [actor’s] situation in order to 
match meanings perceived in the situation with meanings held in the standard” [emphasis 
in the original].138 Here, “standard” refers to a process in which an actor’s decision-
making is continuously and actively accessing an internalized conception of role ideals—
i.e., a psychological regulating mechanism that allows an actor to determine whether a 
perceived situation is congruent with an ideal situation. In the broadest terms, identity 
theory’s implementation of “role” and “standard” imply that an actor will behave in a 
way that reifies this idealized standard in reaction to otherwise contradictory happenings 
in situ of experience. An example along these lines might be a parent who, witnessing her 
child being disrespectful to an older adult, disciplines the child for failure to comply with 
the “standard,” idealized roles. This takes the form of an actor enforcing idealized 
relations among multiple roles (i.e., submissive child role / dominant adult role), and 
which, in so doing, the actor reifies (self-verifies) her own role “standard” (disciplinarian 
parent).  
In essence, where social identity theory imagines behavior as driven by the 
system of groups or categories perceived by an actor (i.e., “There is a group of people I 
perceive, collectively, as ‘leaders’ and who share certain attributes. My behavior toward a 
‘leader’ is based on my assumption that all leaders are, essentially, the same.”), identity 
theory instead sees behavior as a function of an actor’s internalization of perceived social 
roles in the form of standards which the actor seeks to reify (i.e., “I believe that a leader 
should act in a certain way, and my reaction to a leader’s actions is a function of how 
well those actions conform to my standard of how a leader should act in a similar 
situation.”). Identity theory posits that, in the absence of an actor perceiving the 
transgression of roles, such correcting behavior does not occur. In this sense, behavior 
within the construct of identity theory may be described as satisficing behavior, along the 
line of explanation offered by the theory of bounded rationality.139 Such a descriptive 
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paradigm amounts to a tautology, in that actors’ behavior is both exemplified by and 
embodied in behavior intended toward reification of role ideals and grounded in the 
“standard”—necessitating the arguably implausible assertion that, if all behavior is 
essentially “corrective” toward an idealized state, then it must follow that, in the event 
such an idealized state were achieved, there would be no behavior.140  
In either of the approaches presented above, it may be understood that “identities” 
are not permanently fixed ideals but are, rather, plastic concepts—templates, in a manner 
of speaking—the implementation of which changes over time and which may be 
perceived and employed variably by an actor in a manner that affords that actor with 
tools for maintaining a positive self-concept and the ability to pursue interests in a social 
environment. Our identities—our concepts of who we “are” and who others “are”—are a 
function of what is going on, socially, around us in a continuous evaluation that lacks any 
fixed boundaries. 
3. Searching for Direction 
a. Embodying a Network 
If actor identities are understood as shifting and environmentally-determined, then 
fixing them is problematic for any observer. Bruno Latour’s actor-network theory 
provides a relativistic method for analyzing the relationship between an actor’s identity 
and an actor’s environment by centering its analysis on an emic (from the actors’ point of 
view) understanding of how actors exist and interact within their perceived realities. In 
Latour’s words, actor-network theory aims to describe “the very nature of societies.”141 
Actor-network theory is amodern and rejects the notion of exogenous constructions (such 
as history, science, or political systems) as somehow limiting or defining the problem 
space of sociological phenomena; in this way, actor-network theory runs counter to the 
memes invoked in structuralist and institutionalist approaches. “It was devised,” Latour 
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says, “as a reaction to the often too global concepts like those of institutions, 
organizations, states and nations, adding to them a more realistic and smaller set of 
associations.”142 Actor-network theory does not disavow the analytical utility of these 
competing concepts; rather, it provides an epistemology within which these concepts may 
be deconstructed and reinvigorated through an understanding of human experience in 
interrelationship with the perceived worlds of individual actors. 
In Latour’s view, actors themselves may be both human and non-human, and they 
exist as both discrete instantiations as well as in the form of networks of actors: actor-
networks. This dualism is central to the theory. An actor in actor-network theory is 
understood to mean any instantiation of experience that may be differentiated from the 
background—a detectable (even if only hypothetically so) occurrence that, by virtue of 
its existence, changes the prior reality. The temporal component is key, but easily 
overlooked: the mere potential of future action—the possibility of some the projection of 
power within or upon the network—means the network is constantly in flux. A 
commonly cited example of an actor-network is an automobile: while the vehicle may be 
understood as “an actor,” it may also be understood as a “network of actors” insofar as it 
is constructed of myriad inter-related parts. In the latter view, the network has become a 
punctuated actor—a reduction of convenience that serves to represent how a group of 
actors may act together and be understood (and interacted with) as a coherent entity 
rather than as a multiplicity.  
Rather than conceptualizing an actor-network as an assemblage on the whole, it is 
important to emphasize that actors define themselves in terms of their relations with other 
actors. As relational systems, actor-networks should be understood as the medium of 
representation for instances of agencement rather than assemblages of discrete actors 
insofar as “assemblage” is read to mean a grouping or collection of heterogeneous 
components or phenomena.143 The role of agency in agencement is central. As actors 
jointly define themselves through their interrelationships with other actors, agency is 
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attributed to the actors. Agency is, in this sense, a potentiality of some eventual 
“effect.”144  
Consider the example of a man who knows how to make fire by rubbing together 
two sticks. As this man understands the sticks’ potentiality in their possible use through 
friction to generate heat and flame, he affords a measure of agency to the sticks above 
and beyond their being used as, say, tools for digging. The sticks simultaneously afford 
the man the agency of creating fire. This is power: the affordance of agency to an actor—
an actor (a man) defined through his relationship with another actor (sticks), and vice 
versa. Our “man who creates fire with sticks” holds power that another man, absent this 
creative knowledge, would lack. 
Agencement defines the former man while differentiating him from the latter man: 
power relationships, once conceived, are enacted through agencement and may be 
understood as constitutive of an actor’s identity through the lens of actor-network theory. 
But, we must take our example further: it is important to recognize that the power of 
creating fire in this manner exists in the first man’s reality, but it does not exist (and thus 
holds no relevance) in the reality of the second, ignorant man. This second man may 
understand and have a relationship with fire as a phenomenon without necessarily 
understanding how to create or employ it using sticks—that is, without enjoying an 
agential relationship with sticks as a tool to create fire. The first man knows “sticks as 
power” in a way that the second man does not.  
In this, there is no translation of power between the two men’s actor-networks: 
each man inhabits an utterly different reality from the other. They might share, however, 
a common understanding of what “fire” is, knowledge of sticks notwithstanding. Thus, 
their realities may be relatable—their worlds may be translated. Translation, as employed 
in actor-network theory, “is to establish relationships of equivalence between ideas, 
objects, and materials that are otherwise different.”145 Translation may be understood as 
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shared meaning between actors in a manner that facilitates at least a minimum 
“relationship of equivalence,” but this is not to imply that either actor may attribute other 
meanings that are not shared between them. Translation, or rather the absence thereof, 
may be understood as a contributing factor to ethnocentrism. Meanings are only 
translatable through an actor’s shift from an etic to an emic perspective. So, if meaning is 
variable between these two points-of-view, how and why might an actor choose between 
the two alternatives? 
b. Questioning Behavior 
Both social identity theory and identity theory posit that actors behave in a 
manner that verifies or supports the maintenance of a positive self-concept in an 
environment of mentally perceived “others”—either (in social identity’s view) among 
“in-groups” and “out-groups” or (in identity theory) through idealized forms (standards) 
of role relations with others that vary with situational context. The question then becomes 
one of agency. How, and why, do actors rationalize their activity (decisions) in these 
various spaces? In proceeding to answer this question, Monroe presents seven key 
assumptions regarding actor agency that have traditionally been set forth along the line of 
thought that assumes actors make decisions intended to bring about a positive outcome—
rational actor theory: 
(1) Actors pursue goals. 
(2) These goals reflect the actors’ perceived self-interest. 
(3) Behavior results from a process that actually involves (or functions as if it 
entails) conscious choice. 
(4) The individual is the basic actor in society. 
(5) Actors have preference orderings that are consistent and stable. 
(6) If given options, actors choose the alternative with the highest expected 
utility. 
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(7) Actors possess extensive information on both the available alternatives 
and the likely consequences of their choices.146 
This line of reasoning implies several further limitations. First, how much 
information does an actor take into consideration when making decisions? Simon’s 
theory of bounded rationality proposes that the actor functions within a limited decision 
space “bounded” by factors such as time, information about the environment, and 
perceived consequences of action.147 In this manner, bounded rationality implies that an 
actor’s decision making is a function of his environment, salient cultural influences, 
mental capacity for critical thoughts, etc.148 A second limitation stems from societal 
moderating factors. For instance, certain “decision options” will be salient and plausible 
in one socio-cultural context while being decidedly implausible in another socio-cultural 
context.149 Additional issues arise in the analysis of actor choice in that materialist 
approaches are invalidated in a conceptualization of choice that accounts for affectual 
(that is, internal, psychological) outcomes instead of solely accounting for effectual 
(material, observable) ones. The question put forth above may thus be rephrased as “what 
does an actor seek to obtain from a particular decision?” Outcome-focused theory has 
proposed “internal intangible” outcomes in answer to this question, such as the concept of 
ontological security—the proposition that an actor seeks to maintain a stable 
understanding of his world and that some decisions (such as self-sacrifice) cannot be 
understood from a strictly externalist line of inquiry.150 
As Monroe asks, “Why is individual self-interest sometimes pursued and group 
interest pursued at other times?”151 Rational actor theory and its adjuncts may be 
understood as “limiting cases” in a broader theory of decision-making that accounts for 
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holistic processes and both internalized and externalized “outcomes.” Social identity 
theory and identity theory both present frameworks for understanding decision-making 
that account for both the self and others—actors take decisions for themselves but always 
in context of others. Choice thus becomes what Monroe terms a “theory of perspective” 
in which actors may take up and consider various relations between themselves and their 
worlds when making decisions; such a process is not limited by strictly external cost-
benefit outcome weighting. In such a conception of choice, Monroe posits that the 
following factors are central to actor decision making and maintenance of agency: 
(1) Actor choice is always a reflection of an actor’s self-concept. It is 
situational and bounded by identity. 
(2) The importance of normative influence. Actors make decisions in light of 
the entirety of their life experiences, which are entirely subjective. 
(3) Value conflict. Decisions are made as choices among possibly conflicting 
influences—i.e., the need to maintain a positive self-concept in a society 
that idealizes attainment of wealth versus the desire not to be seen by 
peers as “greedy.” 
(4) Emphasis on the difference between “choice” and “strategy.” Actor choice 
must account for affect—emotion and self-concept—and may be 
understood as a strategy to maintain positive affect in the long term even 
when individual “choices” in the short term may be evaluated by an 
external observer (who is limited in the availability of an accurate 
understanding of the actor’s decision space) as “irrational.”152 
Actor choice may be conceptualized as an evaluative process taking place among 
a continuum of possibilities constrained by the actor’s experience, socio-cultural 
situation, and the viability of various options available for employment—i.e., the actor’s 
episteme. In this line of reasoning, actor choice may be explained in terms of “strategic 
agency” in that, when taken at face value and evaluated by an external observer, 
individual decisions in the particular need not necessarily correlate with an actor’s 
intended longer-term outcomes in a more general sense. In essence, strategic agency 
implies that actors may “lose battles in favor of winning the war” and that their 
envisioned outcome may be understood as not merely “more than the sum of its parts” 
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but rather as entirely escaping deduction without due consideration of the overarching, 
moderating influence of identity and socio-cultural factors and situation limiting and 
underpinning the actor’s agency.  
4. Gaining Traction against Reality 
a. Empowerment 
Insofar as an actor understands his experientially constituted actor-networks of 
power to align with his strategic agency, he will resist power changes in those actor-
networks, because such changes are threatening to him (the strategic agent). Humans are 
engaged in a continuous struggle between fulfilling their ideals through actions and social 
roles (“buying-in” to the world as they know it) and, on the other hand, spontaneously 
deciding to “be someone else,” abandoning both their identity and the actor-networks of 
power constituting that identity. But, what is power? 
According to Clegg, “power is best approached through a view of more or less 
complex organized agents engaged in more or less complex organized games.”153 In his 
treatise Frameworks of Power, Clegg outlines a multitude of possible interpretations of 
power’s meaning and the analysis thereof. Power may be understood in terms of both 
“what power is” and in terms of “what power seeks to accomplish”—in other words, 
power as constitutive of relations (means) or as strategy for manipulating relations (ends) 
in networks of power with boundless permutations.154 Power may also be characterized, 
in Dahl’s famous formulation, as that which affords an actor the ability to compel another 
actor to perform some action that, absent operation of power, the second actor would not 
otherwise perform—a formulation that lends itself to separating a problem space into 
“domains of power” in which an actor may exert variable degrees of power.155 In this 
view, a problem of power analysis emerges when one asks if it may be said to exist 
whether, or only if, it is actualized in an observable manner. Taking the broader view, 
power may be understood as a capacity or “a facility to cause something to happen” 
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rather than only as that which actually causes it to happen—in this way, power is 
understood as “dispositional” and may exist without ever being exercised.156 The 
implication of such a view is that perceptions of power, even when not actualized in an 
observable manner, do factor into individual decision-making and behavior. 
In the analysis of power, one may impose a typology based on both the observed 
and the hypothesized actualization of power. Clegg provides a comparison of two models 
addressing power in terms of its “dimensionality” of actualization, as proposed by Lukes 
and Gaventa, respectively. Each of these models presents power across three dimensions: 
observed operation of power (power relationships existing in action), observed non-
operation of power (power relationships existing but hidden), and the epistemological 
frameworks that bound the fields of possibility for the first two dimensions (the 
possibility of power). Gaventa’s model, presented in Table 4, posits that there are (a) 
realized, observable power relationships, (b) latent power relationships that would 
otherwise be enacted but that are not enacted due to rational choice (i.e., lack of interest) 
or lack of opportunity on the part of the actor, and (c) a bounded “field” of possible 
power relations constructed through the constraints of actor identity, motivation, 
imagination, and other barriers serving to limit both the conceptualization of and action 
of power relations generally.157  
The so-called “third dimension” of power may be of special interest in the context 
of our question insofar as it raises a question of how identity affects an actor’s possible 
field of action. It is also important to acknowledge the important role played by the 
concept of relative “perceived weakness” implied in any analysis of power. In many 
ways, actors may be weak not in intention but rather only in lack of actual capability. 
Such a distinction is central when separating friend from foe, as applied in Patrick’s 
survey of the link between state weakness and problems like disease and terrorism: many 
weak states may be willing to counter threats, but they are materially unable to do so in 
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an effective manner.158 While such a capability gap may create an opportunity for a 
stronger external actor to involve itself and engage its resources to shore up a weaker 
actor, it also implies interference with existing networks of power in the weaker state. 
Such events can be destabilizing and initiate a reconfiguration of power and identity 
relations. 
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Table 4. Gaventa’s Three-Dimensional Model 
A/B relations First dimension Second dimension Third dimension 
Power of A over 
B 
Prevalence of A 
over B through 




A constructs barriers 
to the participation 
of B through non-
decision-making and 
the mobilization of 
bias 
A influences and shapes 
B’s consciousness about 
the existence of inequalities 
through the production of 
myths, information control, 
ideologies, etc. 
Rebellion of B 
against the 
benefits held by 
A relative to B 
A defeats B owing 
to B’s lack of 
resources 
B does not 
participate in the 
existing political 
agendas because of 
real and perceived 
barriers to entry and 
owing to 
anticipation by B 
that to participate 
would mean defeat 
Susceptibility to myths, 
legitimation of ideologies; 
a sense of powerlessness; 
an uncritical or fragmentary 
and multiple consciousness 
about issues on B’s part as 
a result of A’s influence, 
shaping and barriers to 
entry 
Powerlessness of 
B relative to A 
Open conflict 
between A and B, 







issues and action 
against barriers 
Formulation of issues and 
strategies 
Source: Clegg, Frameworks of Power, 110. 
 
Power is insidious and evident through all social relations and interactions, 
whether interpersonal or inter-organizational in nature. In the words of one observer, 
governmentality is the matrix through which “Power, though far from evenly distributed, 
floats around [actively] in networks and alliances, inside and around which conflicts and 
points of resistance are articulated.”159 The word actively is added here to emphasize that 
the action of power is not through passive processes—rather, actors actively manage their 
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interactions and exchanges with consistent attention to how their own power, relative to 
other actors, might be impacted. Power has utility not only as a resource to be accrued but 
also as a resource to be expended. Further, it is ephemeral, and exists only insofar as it 
may provide some utility, especially as power grounds an actor by providing a means of 
comparison for an actor in contrast to his surroundings: power enables an actor to 
differentiate among self, other people, objects, environment, and ideas.  
Socially, narratives evolve which facilitate one’s understanding of how these 
things are differentiated, how their relations have come to exist, and how they changed 
over time. Understood in the broadest possible terms, history is that which has been 
known and which is known today—an entire body of knowledge as known from an 
individual’s unique perspective. There are as many histories are there are people with 
memories. The past, which is “ever-present,” provides foundation for individual agency 
and identity. Each man owns the whole of history and, further, is the sole gatekeeper 
responsible for managing the cultivation and maintenance of his history’s narrative. For 
purposes of analysis, objective history does not exist and is not real. It is, rather, an issue 
of which—or, more accurately in the social construct, whose—story one accepts.  
As such, Durepos and Mills posit that a critical understanding of history should be 
one able to “liberate us from the type of history that is an effect of strict historical 
conventions designed to impose the idea of an (ultimately) singular history.”160  
Applying actor-network theory (ANT) to the problem of history, these authors propose an 
“ANTi-history” that exists in the mind of man as a punctuated actor, applying ANT “as 
an approach for understanding knowledge creation of the past as an effect of 
heterogeneous actor-networks.”161  The goal of ANTi-history is to provide a new lens for 
understanding what is known as “past” without the constraints of striving (aimlessly) for 
a firm definition of “the” past. Objective, “true” history in this regard escapes us. In this 
concept, the past is understood as emergent: it is always present, and it is always being 
remade in the mind of the rememberer, as it exists in context of—and in relation with—
                                                 
160 Gabrielle Durepos and Albert J. Mills, “Actor-Network Theory, ANTi-History and Critical 
Organizational Historiography,” Organization 19, no. 6 (November 1, 2012): 712, doi:10.1177/
1350508411420196. 
161 Ibid., 708. 
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present experience. History, in ANTi-history, is by definition a “socio-history.” Socio-
history is itself an assemblage—an actor-network—that may be punctuated, held as a 
coherent “thing,” and exist as an actor. 
Two key issues are deduced from the ANTi-history framework. First, history sells 
itself. Socio-history, when communicated among actors, “flows” like water into nooks 
and crannies—it is adopted as it is useful to other actors. Wherever it can permeate, it 
takes hold to some extent. This is the translation of history through the actor-network. 
Where history fails to translate, alternative histories persist among the actor-networks that 
either deny or are ignorant of other histories. Secondly, translation of socio-history 
implies selective exploitation of a narrative. History means whatever the subject wants it 
to mean. It is twisted and employed in a manner that enhances the agency of the actor-
network enrolling the particular historical narrative. History will be enrolled—i.e., it will 
be meaningful—in a different and unique way depending on how someone is situated and 
biased in space, time, and disposition of ideology and temperament.  
The idea that temporal frames provide material for the discursive construct a 
subject’s identity can be traced to Heidegger.162 Reframing this idea through a lens of 
actor-network theory, however, provides a mechanism for explaining why a particular 
narrative or received view of the past or future may become integrated into an actor’s 
self-concept. Selective translation implies that “An interpretation of knowledge of the 
past or history can only be possible when all of the actors involved in its creation have 
aligned both their interests and their various interpretations of the past.”163 It follows that 
those who share a particular “interpretive” understanding of the past are likely to also 
share contemporary interests. It is important to stress that what we are talking about here 
is the beginnings of belief, and it is through that belief that the past surges through into 
the present. Whether someone in the 1960s believed that Oswald shot Kennedy, or that he 
only believes it now—in the present—the effect is the same. Meaning (instrumental, 
exploitative, agency-giving meaning) is the same across “history” for any given “belief.” 
                                                 
162 Solomon, “Time and Subjectivity in World Politics,” 675. 
163 Durepos and Mills, “Actor-Network Theory, ANTi-History and Critical Organizational 
Historiography,” 715. 
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b. Searching for Truth 
In such a subjective interpretation of reality, objective truth escapes. To know 
what a thing “is” is to contemplate its use. As an innocent and unknowing child may 
learn when handling a sharp blade, an incomplete understanding of the various properties 
and utilities of any entity—any actor—encountered in one’s environment may be 
perilous. The simultaneous and inextricable perception of an actor and its appurtenant 
power affordances underpin agency on the part of the perceiver. Such an experience of 
perception, however, is an active process: a conceptualization, or, more precisely, an 
agencement.  
More than simply an imaginary, agencement is a creative and constitutive act.164 
From a semiotic point-of-view, these agencements, which are epistemically bounded, 
generate the possibility of agency: to know a knife as “a weapon” is to concurrently reify 
an understanding of the knife as “not a weapon,” even if, in the latter case, such an 
understanding is only hypothetical. In short, knowing “what to do with a knife—what it is 
used for” is also to understand, perhaps quite noticeably, “what not to do with a knife.” 
For two observers, one of whom perceives stones as stones per se and another knowing 
them as tools, weapons, and ballast, two different truths exist: a stone is just a stone, but 
it may also be a great many additional things. Two very different actors of “stone” are 
implied. An analogy may here be drawn with the terminology of gestalt psychology: our 
understanding of truth in interaction with our world is not merely a limited or 
representative derivation of an external, objective reality—it is something else entirely, a 
reality all our own. 
This is, essentially, the line of thought put forth by John Dewey’s 
instrumentalism, a logic of induction.165 Dewey’s approach has roots in the pragmatist 
philosophy of Charles Peirce that has been employed in Chapter III – An Ideal Strategy 
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doi:http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.1007/s11948-012-9408-1. 
 85 
to elucidate the requirements of a conceptual model of strategic reality. As noted by 
Godfrey-Smith, the objects and technologies a man interacts with may be seen as being 
“inside, not outside, the mind itself,” and that “it is central to Dewey’s outlook that the 
entanglement between mind and the rest of nature brought about by communicative 
technologies is local and constrained, but not in a way that involves a boundary, either 
standard or unorthodox, between the two.”166 The reality engaged and reified by 
Strategos is self-contained; its ontology is closed, but it innovates tools to perceive and 
navigate the ontology. “Tools,” says Miettinen, “are a means for controlling and steering 
the interconnections between things and a device for coordinating shared human 
activities.”167 Tools may be physical, social, or imaginary: in any case, they are 
punctuated actors. These punctuated actors may include anything from a light-switch to 
one’s particular interpretation of a memory or history, or even an interpretation of 
emotion. The significant turn is that an experience is being interpreted in each case: an 
agencement that reconstructs power relations. 
Reality, in this view, is a tapestry: “Networks are constantly changing as the 
multiple agents exert power on each other.”168 From an emic perspective, decision-
making is enabled by the actor’s ability and drive to reconfigure power relations to its 
own advantage; in appreciation of the complexity and inter-relatedness of the network, 
any reconfiguration locally implies compensatory reconfigurations distally. Waelbers and 
Dorstewitz point out that the only thing necessary for intelligent actors to exhibit morality 
in their decision-making “is the intelligent ability to anticipate consequences and to 
imagine future scenarios.”169 Anticipating and compensating for these effects is a 
derivative act, limited by the actor’s understanding of the larger network; experience and 
creativity (available agencements) bound the episteme of possible courses of action for 
the intelligent and purposeful actor. These imaginaries, while unseen, exist as actors 
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themselves—the invisible is made visible through cognition. Of those agencements, 
ideals and imaginaries such as memory, identity, values, and physiological and 
psychological drives are both limiting and enabling.  
C. SYNOPSIS 
In order for strategy to be considered viable, it must account for two dimensions 
of analysis: the reality of the actor engaged in strategy—i.e., its own reality, the reality of 
Strategos—and the actual structure and mechanics of the larger environment in which 
that actor operates and of which it is a component. In the first dimension we find useful 
phenomenological concepts concerning what it means to experience reality, such as 
Martin Heidegger’s thrownness. In the other dimension, ideas from pragmatism, such as 
Peirce’s cenopythagorean categories and Dewey’s instrumentalism, provide tools for 
understanding how a plurality of realities might be conceptualized. These approaches are 
not mutually exclusive.170 The synopsis that follows is a dialectical map of how these 
two dimensions have been explored above. 
First, the state must be able to approach the other actors it interacts with on a 
common footing. An actor decidedly not a state in its construction or motivation is such a 
person as might be labeled a “terrorist.” The evident theory which affords a foundation to 
both states and individuals is constructivism. International relations theory provides 
models for how we behave in organized state societies, but it does not readily account for 
the behavior and interests of terrorism, which is disruptive to the international system of 
states despite arising outside the theoretical frames of international relations thought. 
Bridging this gap—that we must understand ourselves through one lens while tackling a 
problem visible only through an entirely different lens—is problematic. Social 
constructivism provides an answer by affording a frame that accounts for both individuals 
and states within a common framework that consistently addresses identity and plasticity 
of interests. 
                                                 
170 To wit, John Quay has used just such an integrated approach to discuss how the experience of 
reality impacts contemporary educational paradigms. John Quay, Education, Experience and Existence: 
Engaging Dewey, Peirce and Heidegger (New York: Routledge, 2015). 
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Second, the state must realize that, on approaching an individual actor, it shares a 
common world with that actor. In other words, we must be able to speak of the state as 
being an individual, and vice versa. Providing a framework to encompass the broad 
spectrum of motivations shared by states and individuals is accomplished through critical 
theory: the actors in the shared world are reified in power relationships. As each 
perceives his own power, his perception of the “outside” world is represented in the 
episteme. Struggle ensues when actors share a world in which epistemic conflict occurs. 
Social identity theory and others offer insight into how actors rearrange their perceptions 
of the outside world to provide themselves with salient identity; and, such perceptions fail 
to account for the underlying, dyadic relationship of the actor in question with the non-
actor “rest of the world” each actor perceives. The case in point implies that terrorism 
cannot occur outside of a world in which terrorism is made possible by the existence of 
terrorism’s targets: one cannot exist without the other, and thus isolation and circumspect 
identification of each is impossible. 
Third, if actors cannot be uniquely identified without implication of all other 
actors with which they interact, then a unifying framework of actor identification as a 
network, rather than as a discrete entity, must be employed. Latour’s actor-network 
theory provides just such a framework. All that exists is a network; actors may be 
distilled from the network, but only exist as nodes within a larger web. Without this 
relational context, each supposed actor dissipates and is not identifiable. Nonetheless, 
these so-called “actors” within the actor-network do have discernible, individual 
behaviors. Decision-making is an evaluative process limited by actor perception of the 
rest of the network. Each actor within the network seeks to maximize its agency relative 
to the rest of the network. 
Fourth, if actors within the actor-network are engaged in decision-making 
calculus, it must be driven by relative advantage: power. The power relationships being 
calculated are not overt; rather, the relationships in question are those that bound and 
limit the field of possible further power relations—they are epistemic power relations. 
How an actor perceives an episteme of power involves not only the actors position within 
the observable world but also the actor’s juxtaposition with ideology, history, and other 
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“punctuated actors” that comprise the actor-network of the subject. As objective reality 
may only exist for a particular observer, there is no translation of a “true” reality across 
the actor-network. What a particular actor “knows” is a function of how that actor 
functions within its own actor-network: what is true is what is useful—what is true is 
what affords agency within the entire perceived network of present, past, and future. 
This agency is what all actors seek: strategic agency. All behavior is survival 
behavior. If this maxim is to be taken as true, it must be qualified. While behavior can be 
observed, quantified, and analyzed, the meaning of “survival” is more difficult to 
establish, especially for non-human or non-intelligent actors. Our understanding of 
“survival” in a human sense cannot be limited to persistence in the temporal, worldly 
sense: self-sacrificing decisions are a testament to this. Instead, survival must mean 
continually positioning oneself to maintain agency against a background that includes 
both the observable and the unobservable worlds—history, emotion, and imagination. 
Strategic agency is the drive of each actor which seeks to position the actor in just such a 
way as to maximize its potential relative to and in consideration of the real yet sometimes 
unseen actor-network in which the actor is reified. 
Each perceiving actor—each Strategos—within the network is a locus of inquiry 
for strategy. While these actors are partially constitutive of the larger network, they are 
joined in that network by other actors: the environment, food, water, buildings, animals, 
and so forth. Strategos discerns and manipulates other actors in its perceived world in an 
effort to maintain strategic agency. What Strategos discerns about the network is that 
which it may leverage after and in consideration of the moderating effects of the rest of 
the network which also exert leverage upon Strategos. Returning to the question of how 
the state might best approach an individual actor, we now see that each seeks its own 
strategic agency. Each exists within a unifying, underlying ontology or framework—the 
actor-network—that allows us to discern these and other actors juxtaposed against each 
other. What each “knows” is a function of its own derived power episteme; each can only 
know that which affords power, and each exists as a part of the larger network. 
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V. A SYNTHETIC MODEL OF STRATEGY 
If the doors of perception were cleansed every thing would appear to man 
as it is, Infinite. For man has closed himself up, till he sees all things thro’ 
narrow chinks of his cavern. 
— William Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell 
 
A. PERCEPTION: PROPOSITIONS ABOUT STRATEGOS 
If we were to outlay a set of conditions from which a synthetic model for strategy 
formulation might be constructed, then proposition zero might be that there exist semiotic 
actors in an infinite regression that begins with the “self” versus the “non-self” world and 
proceeds experientially and temporally from that point of distinction. This is essentially 
similar to the “thrownness” of Martin Heidegger.171 Strategos, the perceiving self, is not 
born into the world: Strategos reacts against the world, and so reifies it. To not react 
would be to dissipate into the background, as a drop dissolves into the ocean—a loss of 
agency. The reaction and reification—the possibilities for Strategos opened up by 
“existence as existence”—closely correspond to Heidegger’s concept of “projection.”172 
Strategos struggles to maintain its identity, to leverage its relations with the actor-
network in which it is defined, by agglomerating power for itself relative to the other 
actors it perceives, including its own internalized narratives and ideals. Strategos sets foot 
into the world and seeks to gain traction upon it. All ensuing behavior is survival 
behavior intended to maintain agency for Strategos. 
We may then begin to understand how Strategos pursues different strategic 
agencies depending upon its particular perception or interpretation of the actor-network. 
On the one hand, Strategos may perceive only that part of the world that is commonly 
considered to be immediately observable, seeking evident gains and dealing with “facts” 
at face value—epistemological reductionism. On the other hand, Strategos may take a 
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broader, more circumspect perception, and seek to exploit less obvious connections in the 
actor-network. Such a strategy would entail allowing the network to work mostly for 
itself in its primordial parts while accounting for differing perceptions on the part of the 
other actors represented by these various “parts”—epistemological pluralism, i.e., a 
recognition that the actors in the network behave in sometimes unanticipated ways. That 
the entire network is connected (relationally constituted) and has—even in absence of 
purposeful interference by Strategos—something resembling a trajectory of its own that 
builds out of the cumulative agencies of all the network’s constituents is not disputed; in 
fact, that background collective agency or trajectory of the network in which the 
Strategos exists could be seen as the natural course of the system, corresponding 
somewhat to the dao of Chinese philosophy.173 Even if, in this latter case, Strategos 
adopts a policy of “non-interference” with the network, it still exists as a constituent of 
that network, only “going along” with the other actors so as to maximize congruence of 
its own actions with those of others. 
How Strategos perceives its world—its reality—may be described across two 
dimensions: ontology and locus of power. In the ontological dimension, Strategos 
perceives a world of varying constitution, ranging from the simple to the complex. A 
simple world is comprised of few “parts”—Strategos sees a limited number of actors, 
perhaps punctuated actors with relatively limited motivations or potentials, in an 
epistemologically reductionist world. A complex world, in contrast, is populated by 
numerous other actors, each with its own motivations and desires; this is the world of 
epistemological pluralism, where Strategos possesses knowledge about how each 
constituent of its actor-network functions and how it is motivated, in turn appreciating 
that each actor enjoys its own particular interpretation-in-fact of the shared reality. 
Strategos also positions itself relative to how power relations are shared between itself 
and the rest of its world. Acknowledging that the actor-network is mutually constructed 
by power relations, Strategos may understand itself as having power over other actors and 
also that other actors have power over Strategos. In the extremes, these two cases can 
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only represent reductionism; for Strategos to be powerless, it must be overwhelmed by 
the coalescing external influences brought on by the strategic agency of the network’s 
other actors. By contrast, an all-powerful Strategos must exert power over all other actors 
in the network, thereby creating a reductionist duality, as in the former case.  
A diagram depicting the continuum across which Strategos perceives its strategic 
environment is presented in Figure 3, Continuum of Strategic Perception. At position (A) 
in the figure, Strategos would embody its own power over the rest of the network, thus, at 
the extreme, simplifying the network into a dyad: a free, independent Strategos 
juxtaposed against that which Strategos seeks to leverage to its own advantage, an 
ultimate self-centeredness. Such a Strategos would embody god-like qualities amid a 
simple environment in which it controls all things and is controlled by nothing external to 
itself. At the other end of the spectrum, represented by position (B), Strategos would 
embody its own powerlessness over its world; Strategos has no freedom or independence, 
and its world is a prison—everything that Strategos “is” is defined by externals over 
which it has no influence. This Strategos would, perhaps, be the ultimate passive 
participant, in a way truly “one” with and indistinguishable, to an outside observer, from 
its environment—a subliminal actor with no cogent self-perceived identity, unnoticed and 
unappreciated without a targeted inquiry and creative reflection by an outside observer 
that induces an identity upon the actor and moves it away from the penultimate 
reductionist state and discriminates it as a monad against the background.  
What Strategos “sees” is power. Strategos itself is seen as a powerful force. When 
the agency of a particular actor is seen as congruent with the strategic agency of 
Strategos, that actor is seen as friendly or beneficial. By contrast, when an actor’s power 
potential is non-congruent with the strategic agency of Strategos, that actor is considered 
a threat. How Strategos interacts with these other actors define what Strategos “is”—the 
relations constitute the actors. 
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Figure 3. Continuum of Strategic Perception 
It is important to note that the power relations also constitute Strategos; thus, for 
example, in case (A) as presented in the figure, Strategos is discursively defined by that 
over which it exerts power—a simple understanding of the world, in which changing the 
nature of those things is to change Strategos, with such a contingency likely being 
perceived as ontologically threatening to Strategos—and vice-versa in case (B). 
Recognizing that, we contrast these two extremes to that of position (C), where Strategos 
understands a balance of power between itself and the rest of the actor-network in which 
it exists. The balanced actor-network is occupied by other actors, each of which enjoys its 
own strategic agency in a pluralist construction. This position along the spectrum of 
perception is also, however, a world of complexity; and, in that complex network, 
Strategos struggles to reach an equilibrium point with other actors such that its own 
strategic agency is balanced amidst the rest of the network. 
As an example, in the abstract, the United States is an actor that is constituted by 
and draws power from a number of other actors: the geographic region occupied by its 
territory; its population; its natural resources; ideals like “freedom” and the rule of law; a 
particular national history; an image of esteem among its peers; and, its military forces, 
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among numerous others. Without these things, the United States does not exist. If these 
things cease to give power to the United States, then it is weakened. If other actors 
subvert or overshadow the constitutive powers of the United States, those actors 
constitute a threat to the United States in terms of identity (present empowerment) and 
continued existence (future empowerment)—threatening its strategic agency. As the 
actors which constitute the United States change and evolve over time, the United States 
itself changes and evolves. The question for the strategist is to what extent the United 
States defines, in present and in future tense, its circumstances—the actors which 
constitute its identity—and to what extent it is defined by its circumstances. A balanced 
understanding of how these factors mutually define each other while also representing the 
entity we know as “the United States” is essential to analysis of the situation and to the 
development of strategic purpose for the Strategos of the conceptual reality—the United 
States. 
B. REALITY: THE ROLE OF STRATEGIC AGENCY 
Latour’s description of how actor-networks model the “real” world is simply 
related: “things do not hold because they are true; which is the story spun by science in 
the classroom. Instead, he argues, things are true because they hold.”174 Realizing that 
each actor exists semiotically with the rest of its actor-network, these actors perceive each 
other in terms of how they afford power—their agencement: what they represent, what 
they can be used for. As an actor perceives the world in which it exists and interacts, its 
actions are informed and guided by its effort to leverage power in its environment, its 
actor-network. Strategos, like all actors, is motivated to maintain strategic agency in its 
relations with other actors. 
Objective reality, in this model, is featureless and “smooth.” Reality is un-
discriminated and undivided; it is, in the words of William Blake, “Infinite.” As an 
observer begins to discern his own separateness from his environment, and begins further 
dividing his thoughts and sensations and the features he identifies in his environment, a 
semiotic avalanche occurs. Who the observer is, is a function of what he perceives. As his 
                                                 
174 Emphasis in the original. Clegg and Haugaard, The SAGE Handbook of Power, 132. 
 94 
perceptions take form through agencement, they both empower and constitute the identity 
of the observer. He is defined by that which he can discern and leverage. The actor-
network embodied through his perception—his experience—is entirely his own, and does 
not correlate to “objective reality”—it is merely derived from it. The observer cannot 
engage his world in any way which lessens his agency in that world. At any given time, 
the net constitution of the observer, as derived from the actor-network power relations 
which constitutes him, is his “strategic agency;” this is the power he holds in the network 
and the power the network holds over him. As the network changes, the observer will 
either change or resist change, but will always maximize its strategic agency in relation to 
the changing and reconfigured network. For our model, we call the observer “Strategos,” 
and we call his experienced world “strategy.”  
The three requirements of an ideal strategy as set forth in Chapter III, An Ideal 
Strategy are handling of actor identity, a model of actor behavior, and a system of actor 
description. Building these from Charles Peirce’s three categories, we may then postulate 
that, firstly, identity—a concept that constrains the field of “what is an actor” and “what 
is not an actor”—emerges from a boundless background of power in the most abstract 
sense. Secondly, the interactive behavior of actors—how they are motivated and why 
they do the things they do—is determined by their being constructed of power relations; 
it is only the effect of these constitutive power relations that enable us to discern one 
actor from another, though this is a hidden, subliminal phenomenon. Thirdly, description 
is the domain of the emergent epistemology that is subjectively experienced by each 
observing actor in the strategy; the diverse world of description is one of labels, logics, 
and discursive experiences in which each actor is grounded by its own strategic agency. 
Ergo, we may set forth a distilled framework that describes what strategic agency is, what 
it does, and how it is useful, formulated as follows: 
(1) Power is that which affords agency to an actor.175  
(2) Actors are reified in terms of their power affordances to each other.176 
                                                 
175 Recalling Peirce’s categories, point (1) of the framework would correlate with the monad “world” 
background, a void without form in which there is only an abstraction of power. 
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(3) Observed actors may be human or non-human.177 
(4) Actors are relationally constituted in actor-networks. 
(5) Actor-network relations are plastic.  
(6) All relations within the network of actors are power relations. 
(7) Actor identity is a function of power affordance relations within the actor-
network.  
(8) A network of actors may be understood as an agglomerate actor (the 
punctuated actor). 
(9) The past (socio-history) and imagined futures exist as punctuated actors. 
(10) Intentionality of actors is driven toward reification of the particular 
punctuated actor-network (episteme of power relations) that affords an 
actor the maximum relative level of power: strategic agency. 
Power is understood to be anything which affords agency to an actor; agency in 
this sense is the ability to act, to do… to exist. Actors are themselves agencements. 
Discursively, the mere existence of other actors affords distinction of identity, and thus 
some element of power. In order for an actor to exist and have identity, it must exist in 
context of other actors—for instance, “I” versus “not-I”—in an actor-network. The plural 
in “actors” is significant. For the actor pair to exist, it must be observed, either by a third 
external actor, or by one of the two actors which has the ability to perceive the passage of 
time. In the latter case, the temporal perception creates the necessary third actor: the past, 
contra the present. Wherever an actor is identified as distinct from other actors, each actor 
holds implicit power insofar as each actor “is” something that another may wish to 
become, to say nothing of influence over other actors. In the actor-network, power scales 
without being destroyed; this is true regardless of whether multiple actors are 
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177 At point (3) of the framework, we emerge to Peirce’s third category; this and all subsequent points 
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reality. 
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agglomerated into a punctuated actor or vice-versa, where actors are subdivided into 
multiple constituent actors. 
Actors’ ability to perceive other actors’ existence is a function of perceiving 
actor’s comprehension of how other actors may afford power. That which cannot be 
exploited or mentally manipulated as a unique concept, category, or phenomenon, does 
not exist in the reality of the perceiver. In this vein, “actor” can include any unique 
concept, category, or phenomenon. Actors may be people, but also ideas, narratives, 
abstract concepts like “nation-state” or “freedom,” and also non-human elements of the 
environment, such as plants, animals, and built structures. All of these concepts represent 
power in some form, as they are leveraged by other actors. Within the actor-network, 
each actor is relationally constituted. The power affordances which actors exploit among 
each other may be relatively less or more important or useful, but all relations are power 
relations. The relations between actors—how power is leveraged among them—allow 
actors to be discerned and identified. Likewise, a change in the actor-network—a change 
in power relations—is always compensated elsewhere in the network. Power is never lost 
or destroyed, only translated across the network: relations in the actor-network are 
plastic.  
Actors identify other actors in terms of how power relations are distributed across 
the network. Multiple actors may be perceived as a single actor (for instance, a car, 
versus a collection of independent components which makes up the car), known as a 
punctuated actor. Likewise, the past (a punctuated actor) is constituted of multiple related 
but distinct memories and narratives. The future is similarly constructed. Intelligent 
actors with the ability to perceive the past and possible futures are constituted just as 
much by their relations with these actors as they are by their relations with other physical 
actors (i.e., the observable world). Actors are motivated to maintain agency in the context 
of other actors in the actor-network. All observed behavior of actors is intended toward 
maintenance of agency in the entire actor-network as perceived by that actor at the time 
the action is taken: this is strategic agency.  
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Ties in relational networks have two fundamental attributes: form and content.178 
Form refers to “how” nodes in the network are connected; content refers to what is 
transferred across each connection. In the actor-network of strategic agency, the form of 
the relations is power, and their content is identity; these are two sides of the same coin. 
It is important to not assume “wholeness” of the network; this is an implicit flaw of 
institutionalism and structuralism, which position institutions (like states) and structures 
in a vacuum absent other types of actors, denying the analytical relevance of other types 
of actors. In this vein, relationality is sometimes presented in a negative light as being 
tautological. For instance, Stewart Clegg raises one potential concern:  
How is institutional change possible if actors’ intentions, actions, and 
rationality are conditioned by the institutions they wish to change? In 
other words, how can they exert agency as power against those structures 
that constrain them, if those structures do, indeed, constrain them? How do 
we avoid reducing structure to action, or action to structure, or of merging 
both? Either actors’ freedom or structural constraint must be denied. The 
answer resides in developing a more focused way of thinking about 
practices as standing at the intersection of structure, events, and 
experiences.179 
The strategic agency framework offers a solution to this problem. The “answer” 
does not rely in a more nuanced understanding of a dyad, as Clegg suggests. Instead, 
when two equal but opposite actors which are mutually constituted by power relations are 
in conflict, the analyst must broaden the scope of the network beyond the two opposing 
actors. Including other actors (in this example, non-institutional actors) as part of the 
actor-network will allow the analyst to take account for how the two opposing actors 
draw power from their networks. In other words, yes, actors are mutually constituted 
through relations. Their mutual constitutions do not, however, fully define the entire 
network. Each will have its own empowerments from other actors—like capital, political 
support, and geography—which will determine the eventual outcome of conflict. Each of 
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Theory 31, no. 3 (2013): 226. 
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these other actors, in turn, is constituted by other actors. To measure these factors in sum 
is to measure the strategic agency of each opposing actor against that of the other. 
For Strategos to employ strategy, a network must be constructed. That network 
must embody the actors with which Strategos will interact. These may be states, social 
groups, natural resources, non-state and sub-state actors, tools, defining values and 
narratives, and other relevant points of consideration. In the case of a state strategy, the 
array of actors might include, for starters: 
- Regions and formal regional institutions 
- International bodies and organizations 
- States and state resources, like military and diplomatic mechanisms 
- Sub-state regions and state institutions 
- Ethnic and religious groups and sects 
- Elements of national and cultural identity like landmarks and contested 
narratives 
- Critical transportation pathways like ports and pipelines 
To develop a strategy, each of these collections of actors would be established 
first as an entity, and then, in turn, subdivided into its constituent actors. The level of 
detail to be developed must be sufficient to develop a useful analog of real-world actors. 
Understanding the strategic agency of each actor—what each actor “wants” and “wants to 
be”—in context of the larger network would then allow actors to be grouped according to 
analytical themes, like geographic location, commonalities of culture or faith, 
commonalities of dependencies upon other actors (such as conventional resource 
requirements in the vein of defense and industry), or other useful categories. Each actor 
of the emergent actor-network constitutes a node in the complex system of the strategy. 
Greater interconnectedness among these nodes implies greater complexity, but also a 
more accurate representation of reality. Once modeled, specific courses of action may be 
analyzed for their potential effect on the actor-network. These courses of action, in the 
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broad and communicated context of the actor-network from which they derive, constitute 
the strategy. 
Such a strategy would, in sum, answer the three requirements of an ideal strategy 
as set forth in Chapter III, An Ideal Strategy:  
(1) Handling of actor identity 
(2) Model of actor behavior 
(3) Actor description 
The framework presented here allows actor identity to be articulated across a 
continuum to whatever level of detail is determined as appropriate by the analyst. All 
actor behavior is understood to be intended toward maintenance of agency in the context 
of the contemplated network (strategic agency). Also, actors may be described by their 
relations to other actors or by any other frame of convenience, such as by their 
conventional labels or functions, without reference to any externally-imposed theoretical 
typology—terms like “state” and “institution” may be used in their vernacular sense 
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VI. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
All revolutions naturally appear novel when contrasted with the status quo 
against which they react. 
—Adrian Johnston, Time Driven:  
Metapsychology and the Splitting of the Drive  
 
A. APPLICATION 
Theories of society, such as those invoked in international relations and political 
science, often invoke universal laws and concepts that are more categorizing than 
animating. Marxism and the structuralism of class conflict provides a ready example, as 
do theories relying on similar overt categorizations—Huntington’s civilizations, for 
instance. In the other extreme, theory positing the individual as forever locked behind a 
veil of impenetrability and epistemic subjectivity offers little hope for explaining 
macrosocial phenomena as anything other than coincidence, hence the difficulty 
experienced by social constructivists in articulating a comprehensive theory without 
necessitating the buttresses of culture, organizational psychology, and the like. As an 
alternative, the analyst may turn away from the endings and beginnings of society—the 
individual and the world polity—and look instead on the processes in action between 
these extremes. The employment of “mechanisms and processes,” as noted by Bousquet 
and Curtis, obviates the need for identification of “general covering laws” and “avoids 
the pitfalls of various forms of methodological and phenomenological individualism, on 
the one side, and holistic and structuralist accounts, on the other, by focusing on the 
interactions and processes that bind and reconfigure individual entities.”180 The actors of 
the strategic agency model are not phenomenologically privileged; while they do enjoy 
their own particular perspectives and identities, they also interact and translate power 
across the network. The strategic agency model provides advantages over other models in 
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that it facilitates analysis that is methodologically neutral, amoral, ahistorical, astructural, 
and apolitical. The model also obviates the need for fundamental reliance on derived 
mimetics such as “strategic culture,” Huntington’s “civilization” concept, “religion,” or 
“ethno-nationalist identity,” instead providing a framework in which these memes may be 
applied at the discretion of the analyst to facilitate mapping power relations in actor-
networks pre-, trans-, and post-strategy implementation. 
The utility of the strategic agency model is entirely circumstantial. Its accuracy in 
correlating strategy or analysis to real-world observed events is dependent upon how the 
analyst understands the actor-network and appreciates the strategic agencies of the actors 
invoked in that network. In international relations, for instance, more information would 
seem to be better. A state is a state, and yet a state is many things. To build out an actor-
network of states only would still involve some understanding of how each state will seek 
to maximize its position relative to other states. Adding to this base layer of analysis, 
additional considerations are possible (and appropriate), such as: how power will be 
evaluated by peers in the network (monetarily, militarily, diplomatically); how domestic 
factors may influence the state’s actions internationally (by detracting focus from world 
affairs or by encouraging outward-focused behavior and projects); how particular 
narratives important to national identity must be maintained; and how non-state actors 
will influence the state’s interactions with other states. Each of these additional factors 
itself becomes an actor in the actor-network; each enjoys a strategic agency of its own. 
To the extent an analyst introduces external typologies (like “state,” “group,” and 
“money”) into the analysis, the utility of the strategic agency model will be limited. Each 
external category or concept introduced serves to generate a “punctuated actor” in the 
network, which may serve to facilitate easier analysis by simplifying the larger actor-
network at the cost of analytical detail. 
As discussed in Chapter II, The Evident Strategy, one exigency of national 
security strategy is the ability to account for complex motives and behaviors by actors. 
Strategic agency allows the definition of an actor—a state or an armed group, for 
instance—while also affording analysis of how that actor might engage in behaviors that 
seem incidental to the received view of what its motivations might be. For instance, 
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consider that in the summer of 2016, the Libyan National Army (LNA), a politically-
affiliated militia force, ostensibly engaged in a fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and 
al Sham (ISIS), turned its efforts to gain control of key oil production facilities. The LNA 
used “counter-ISIS operations as cover to project influence” over the petroleum 
production sites.181 While conventional frames might suggest that the LNA would seek 
to defeat the ISIS influence in its region, the strategic agency model allows a more 
nuanced analysis. For starters, strategic agency encourages the analyst to ask first how 
the LNA, however defined, exerts leverage in its environment—such as through funding, 
political influence, or attainment of status among peer groups. Another relevant example 
is that Russia, while performing anti-ISIS operations in Syria, may be seeking to exploit 
Russian involvement in the region to deploy an anti-ship missile capability which would 
“deny the U.S. freedom of movement and increase the Kremlin’s ability to pressure the 
U.S. into accepting its expansionist military agenda.”182 
In both of these cases, strategic agency implies that an analyst formulating 
strategy should account for the fact that any actor involved will seek to leverage the 
totality of circumstances to its own advantage. This has implications for coalition-
building and for security management at home and abroad.  
In security analysis, understanding that all actors seek to maintain strategic 
agency begs a question of how each actor will work to exploit current events, its 
involvement in particular affairs, and the involvement of others to its own advantage. 
This is not a “zero-sum” analysis—the shifts in relative power implicit in world affairs 
necessitate a continual cycle of action-reaction and compensatory adjustments. Individual 
human actors need food, water, space, and freedom to operate. Once those are acquired, 
they will leverage their relationships with each other and with the rest of their 
environment to persist. Their efforts in persistence will be moderated by available 
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resources and idealized factors like “values” and “culture” to the extent that these, as 
actors themselves, continue to afford power. 
The 2015 United States National Security Strategy (NSS), as presented, is not 
about what “they” want—it’s about what “we” want. In a very real way, the reality 
presented in the NSS is a half-truth: it presents a façade, an array of the faces of the 
“others” occupying the world of the United States; but, behind the façade, the NSS utterly 
fails to account for what these “others” want out of the world—what empowers the 
“other.” The motivations and desires of these other actors are not inconsequential. For a 
strategy to be tenable, it must afford the strategist an ability to predict the outcome of his 
interactions with a broad field of “others.” 
B. ANALYTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
For the analyst, the strategic agency framework may be distilled into a series of 
maxims. Succinctly, one may say simply that discourse is power, and power is 
everything; but, specifically: 
(1) You only perceive what you can leverage. For all practical purposes, 
nothing else exists. 
(2) Everything you perceive in the world empowers you. Terms, concepts, 
narratives, and categories are important.  
(3) You are defined by what empowers you, by the things you can leverage 
and react against. You are defined as much by your fears as by your goals. 
Your perception of your place in the world defines how you will interpret 
novelty; change is fluid, not abrupt, and “new” things will always be 
interpreted in context of prior things. 
(4) Contraversion is important. It is impossible to define victory without 
defining defeat. Pay attention to both, and take care to articulate the 
important but often-unspoken things. 
(5) Hierarchies and categories are merely descriptive frames superimposed 
atop an underlying network. In every case, categories and groupings move 
the analysis toward reductionism and away from the zenith of complexity 
which most closely correlates with the likely behavior of the network in 
reality. 
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(6) Things which empower multiple actors are likely to be contested. Special 
focus on an accurate and nuanced understanding of how identity and 
meaning of these contested actors is translated across the network is 
crucial. Don’t focus on dominating a narrative. Focus instead on how 
various interpretations of a narrative empower those who contest it. 
As two examples of this approach, let us consider contemporary Russia. In 2014, 
observers noted that “Russia’s desire to build a Eurasian Union around itself is a 
captivating puzzle for political scientists and everyone interested in current international 
developments.”183 The Eurasian Economic Union seeks to pursue a policy of deep 
integration, in many ways a re-joining of independent states once part of the former 
Soviet Union, and Russia is seeking to enhance its ability to strike trade and security 
deals with its neighbors (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan).184 The actors 
involved are not just the states named, but also the European Union (in some ways, an 
antagonist) and domestic constituencies in each state. In the case of Russia, an important 
domestic actor is the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC); the ROC has been seen as a 
vehicle for advocating Russian state policies abroad.185 From the strategic agency 
perspective, one might ask several key questions: 
(1) From what does the ROC draw power? Likely answers include its 
adherents and its relationships with states and non-state actors. 
(2) How does the ROC constitute national identity for the states of the 
Eurasian Economic Union? In states where the ROC is highly represented, 
it is likely to be used as a vehicle to further Russian policies of expanding 
and cementing the Union. 
(3) If threatened, such as by a turn away from religion, is the Russian state 
likely to respond to shore up the ROC? Such a response might involve the 
state advocating religious beliefs and the role of the church. 
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(4) Might the ROC be a potential target for actors wishing to weaken Russian 
influence in its region? If yes, then one might explore exactly how the 
ROC would be targeted—perhaps through the introduction of “competing” 
values, i.e., Western values. 
A preliminary analysis like that above would yield an understanding that the 
Russian Orthodox Church is a central part of what may be called “Russia,” that Russia 
and the ROC might react negatively to the introduction of competing narratives (like 
Western secularism and the turn away from religiosity) because they serve to decrease 
the power of the ROC and therefore of the Russian state.186 A more in-depth analysis 
might examine how the ROC is engaged locally throughout its footprint; i.e., how does 
the ROC provide power to local populations, such as through provision of identity and 
socio-cultural security and involvement in local politics? 
As another example, consider the issue of Russia and “non-Western” science, 
which represents a politicization of choice. Some Russian academics have shut-out non-
Russian science and theory for basically political purposes, but they have provided a 
faux-scientific reason for doing so.187 This tendency builds upon and perpetuates a 
narrative of conflict between Russia and the West, where “the boundary between the 
West and the non-West takes ontological priority to any dividing line in social and 
cultural reality.”188 The allegation is that Western thought is somehow polluting the 
purity of Russian intelligentsia, and, further, that any of the West’s so-called “universal 
values” are inherently detrimental to Russia because they have originated in the West. 
This has resulted in science driving “theory designed as purposely non-Western,” which 
ignores the cost that such a theory will be “bound to remain self-referential and, in the 
final analysis, irrelevant.”189 It is important to also recognize that Russian state reforms 
of higher education have resulted in dramatic cuts to universities and pushback from 
academia, including “mass protests against the reformation of the Russian Academy of 
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Science … and the efficient exposure of a long list of faked or plagiarized dissertations 
defended by high officials” and others.190 In light of these facts, an analyst might begin 
an inquiry along these lines: 
(1) What is the relationship between the Russian state and its academic 
institutions? A goal here might concern establishing a tolerance level at 
which the Russian state would be degraded by fomenting unrest among its 
academic community; i.e., an understanding of how likely the state is to 
support pro-regime academics and attempt to control its academic 
institutions for state benefit. 
(2) Where do Russian academicians draw their power? Some esteem and 
opportunities for professional advancement might be domestic and others 
international. These may be incongruent; some researchers may be 
motivated to participate in a broader international dialog, while others may 
be motivated to play to the interests and motives of nationalism. 
(3) What are the artifacts of power in Russian academia? Empowering 
achievements might include the freedom to publish in international and 
domestic journals, access to state-controlled research facilities, and 
promotional opportunities within the education bureaucracy. 
For the development of strategy, these two cases provide insight. An 
understanding that the Russian state is comprised in part by the ROC and by its academic 
community facilitates a more nuanced appreciation for how the state itself might behave 
at a macro-scale. When combined with analysis of other sectors—economic, defense, 
political, etc.—the strategic agency for the state can be distilled. With this in hand, the 
analyst may proceed to construct a strategy to deal with each of these actors in turn. 
As we have seen, the 2015 NSS is concerned with not only states but also with 
non-state actors—namely, terrorist groups. Much of the dialectic presented in Chapter IV, 
Illuminating Strategos is approached from the perspective of terroristic conflict, which 
prompts an explanation of how the analytical maxims of strategic agency might be 
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applied to a terrorist or terrorist group. Let us consider, then, a hypothetical terrorist, 
perhaps a violent Salafi jihadist (VSJ).191 
Taking the first maxim, “you only perceive what you can leverage,” we must ask, 
“What is perceived?” If a man is perceived, we must ask, “through which frame do we 
perceive the man?” If the man is an Arab, is that man perceived through frames of 
Western individualism, or Arab collectivism?192 If the former, our analysis of the man 
will tend more toward a depiction that tends to isolate the individual in a way that fails to 
capture important cultural features which blur the lines between the individual and the 
family—as well as other social groups—more so than in Western culture. Likewise, if the 
individual is an American VSJ who has a more individualistic bent, we may also account 
for how that individual’s perception of reality and his place among his peers is cast in a 
different light from, say, his Arab VSJ peers; i.e., we may recognize that an 
individualistically-tending VSJ may have a tendency to identify in a fundamentally 
different way with his social peer group than a more collectivist-tending Arab VSJ, 
exposing potential points of strategic opportunity. In this, the bias of the analyst is 
central; whether she perceives an individual in the Western sense or a man-as-component 
of a family and social hierarchy will be a factor of her ability to “leverage” these distinct 
categories in her analysis—she must know that there is a difference in order to perceive 
one. 
This brings us to the second maxim, that “everything you perceive in the world 
empowers you.” Consider that the ability to perceive the difference in cultural tendencies 
between our two imaginary American and Arab VSJ’s has empowered the analyst in our 
example such that she leverages a tool which another analyst, absent that perception, 
would lack. The circumstances in which this empowerment occurs are obviously 
important. For a security analyst engaged in the routine study of VSJ terrorists, the 
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benefit of this nuance is evident; for a lay person who is not routinely exposed or 
challenged with a circumstance in which these two social categories are salient, the 
empowerment of discerning those categories would perhaps be only a novelty. Likewise, 
a lay person unknowledgeable about the difference in these two cultural paradigms might 
be said to inhabit a fundamentally different actor-network than our analyst; for in such a 
case, ignorance has generated two distinct sets of “other.” Translating these distinct 
conceptions must then be accomplished through explanation of the cultural nuance in a 
way that is relatable between both the analyst and the lay person. For strategy 
development, the evident implications of this example are how to cultivate a mindset that 
checks ethnocentric bias and incentivizes nuanced analysis. 
We have now also demonstrated the third maxim, that our analyst and the 
ignorant layman are both “defined by that which empowers [them].” The distinction 
drawn between these two individuals is that one holds power of division and discernment 
that the other does not. Whether this is useful to a third party will also be determined by 
whether such a quality is empowering to that third party—i.e., is the third party in a 
position or circumstance in which knowing or interacting with nuanced analysis would be 
empowering or irrelevant? 
This leads us to the fourth maxim, that “contraversion is important.” The analyst 
must determine which of the imposed categories are useful and understand the 
implications of their use. For instance, to define a man—that is, a male—is also define 
that which is “not male;” to define a subject as VSJ is to draw a distinction with all that 
are “not VSJ;” and, to understand the frame of collectivism is to reify the category of 
“not collectivist,” and so on. Each new iteration of categorization and imposition of 
distinct traits upon the subject necessitates a recursive imposition of those distinctions 
upon all other subjects; those subjects—actor entities—not being directly contemplated in 
the analysis are nonetheless reconfigured in their relation to the novel subject and are thus 
redefined in terms of their relation to that subject as being more or less like the subject. 
This exemplifies the permeating relationality of the actor-network, as well as its 
plasticity. 
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We must remember, however, the fifth maxim: “Hierarchies and categories are 
merely descriptive frames superimposed atop an underlying network.” In the hypothetical 
analysis, there is, in fact, an underlying and homogenous actor-network. The frames and 
categories imposed are artifices of the analyst; each time an analytical subject is grouped 
or categorized, a simplification occurs, and with each simplification the analyst sacrifices 
complexity for convenience. The implication of this phenomenon is that nuance should 
be held at premium value, and that imposed categories and descriptions should always be 
questioned for their utility and the possibility that they might prevent otherwise viable 
strategic alternatives from emerging. 
This brings us to the sixth and final maxim, that “things which empower multiple 
actors are likely to be contested.” Perhaps our analyst is composing a strategy alongside a 
colleague. Let us also suppose also that the VSJ subject of their analysis is Adam 
Gadahn, an American-born Al Qa’ida spokesman.193 As the object of contention, let us 
consider Gadahn’s cultural tendency as a natural-born American who was born in 
Oregon. For the analyst and her colleague, a hypothetical point of contention might be 
that the analyst advocates for an understanding of Gadahn as an individualist and thus 
“different” from his (perhaps non-individualistic) non-American VSJ peers. Let us 
suppose that the colleague, however, refuses to entertain the nuance that Gadahn could be 
fundamentally different in this regard, and that the colleague insists that Gadahn “is just 
like the other terrorists.” On the other hand, let us consider Gadahn himself, who, if 
situated among Arab VSJ’s who tend toward collectivism, might, in the vein of social 
identity theory, be perceived by his peers as “different” due to his American upbringing, 
so perhaps Gadahn would take some pains to show his similarity and camaraderie with 
his peers in order to minimize any perceived differences. In both of these scenarios, the 
Gadahn’s cultural tendencies, however derived, are contested because they empower 
multiple actors. In the first scenario, the analyst is empowered due to her perceived 
advantage through understanding the nuance of cultural differences; her colleague is 
empowered through his desire to entertain a more simplified analysis, perhaps because of 
193 George Michael, “Adam Gadahn and Al-Qaeda’s Internet Strategy,” Middle East Policy 16, no. 3 
(Fall 2009): 135–52. 
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expediency, or a desire to not be seen by peers as someone who humanizes a perceived 
enemy, or myriad other reasons. In the second scenario, both Gadahn and his peers are 
empowered by the perception of his difference. For Gadahn, this potential is realized on 
several levels, most evidently as his eventual employment as a spokesman for Al Qa’ida 
who addressed the West directly with some projected air of authority as a former 
American citizen and the consequent elevation of his esteem within his peer group. We 
might also suppose that Gadahn would be viewed with some suspicion among his peers 
who held different cultural tendencies, perhaps also motivating some intrigue or 
opportunity that would not have otherwise occurred. 
In any of these cases, whether dealing with a state actor or a non-state actor, an 
analyst must be attentive to the application of categories, types, and kinds; the cultural, 
institutional, and societal biases that underpin and entrain particular modes of thinking 
over time; and the expected utility of any particular nuance in detail or understanding as 
weighed against the costs in terms of verbosity, abstract complexity, and social and 
material barriers to efficient translation of analysis to other consumers who may lack the 
incentive to understand the analysis at a deep level of detail. In answering these 
imperatives, the analyst should again consider the six maxims: when developing a 
communicative product for a consumer, one must understand how that product will serve 
to empower the intended consumer and tailor the product accordingly. To couch this in 
terms of the present thesis and context: the strategic agency of the analytical product will 
be a function of how well it aligns with the strategic agency of the product’s consumer. 
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Then I asked: “Does a firm persuasion that a thing is so, make it so?” 
He replied: “All Poets believe that it does, and in ages of imagination this 
firm persuasion removed mountains; but many are not capable of a firm 
persuasion of any thing.” 
—William Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell 
 
A. THE POSSIBILITY OF A BETTER NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 
Observing that the 2015 NSS has some considerable deficits, this thesis has asked 
how an ideal NSS might be constructed. The framework presented here—strategic 
agency—provides a mechanism for constructing a “strategic world.” Built out of power 
relations, the actors of the strategic world pursue their own persistence in leveraging 
other actors in a broad network. The strategic actor-network includes not only human 
actors and physical entities, but also more ephemeral concepts such as narratives and 
ideals particular to specific actors.  
Strategic agency represents the intentionality of an actor which is driven toward 
reification of the particular punctuated actor-network (episteme of power relations) that 
affords that actor the maximum relative level of power. Every actor in the network has 
strategic agency, but not every actor in the network is equally relevant to analysis. A 
national security strategy must, in effect, make “informed choices” about where to focus 
its analysis. Some actors in its strategic world are necessarily more relevant than others in 
regards to time and potential impact on the “Strategos” enacting the strategy. Strategos 
defines problems in terms of understanding how the constituents of its world interact with 
each other and with Strategos; and, Strategos is limited because its own understanding is 
based on incomplete and subjective interpretations of the broader world. 
The approach presented here might inform the construction of a national security 
strategy for the United States that makes no a priori assumptions about American ideals 
and intents in the world. This thesis has shown that the Strategos at the center of a 
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strategy is constituted and empowered by other “actors” like national values, elements of 
national power, and influence over other states, regions, and spheres of global society. To 
construct a strategy, each of these must be analyzed in order to construct an accurate, 
coherent representation of what the United States “is.” Only then can the strategy begin 
to build upon a foundation of its own identity in understanding the other, external actors 
of the world it seeks to engage with and influence, whether these are nation-states, 
terrorist groups, environmental or biological threats, or politicians and businesses. 
B. THE REALITY OF COMPLEXITY IN STRATEGY 
An effective strategy must evolve. At best, a strategy represents an accurate 
representation of reality that enables a purposeful actor—the Strategos—to achieve its 
aims in the strategic environment. At worst, a strategy consists of an assortment of truth-
claims and vague fears. In reality, the world is complex, and no thinking human agent can 
enjoy omniscience or omnipresence. As a result, the thinking human agent constructs a 
mental model of the world and how it works. The strategic agency framework presented 
here attempts to capture the essence of that process and translate it into a formula that can 
be modeled as a system, discussed among analysts and planners, and leveraged to inform 
purposeful planning and action.  
The challenges of implementing the strategic agency framework are myriad, but 
not insurmountable. Opportunities include exploring methods for how a world system 
may be constructed and modeled in a way that facilitates communication and 
collaboration by analysts, making the strategic insights of such project available to 
specialists and practitioners across the national spectrum, and educating leaders on the 
importance of nuanced messaging that strives to maintain an accurate, pluralistic 
representation of the real world while answering the motivational and identity needs of 
the nation-state actor. 
Two underlying assumptions of this thesis are that strategy matters and that 
strategy must be self-consistent in its construction and concepts. The strategic agency 
framework, if realized, will answer these assumptions in perhaps a novel way: by de-
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centering the agent of the strategy, yet recognizing the crucial role played by Strategos in 
its strategic world. 
When asked why he chose to pursue a PhD in philosophy, homeland security 
scholar Christopher Bellavita answered, sublimely, “I liked ideas.” An idea is powerful 
thing. But, all things are powerful. As this thesis has shown, it is the power relations 
between our “selves” and all the things and ideas we discern in our world that define who 
we are. As we are thrown (to use Heidegger’s term) into the world, we cannot shield 
ourselves from the cacophony of our discursive experience which constructs us and 
defines us. When we construct a strategy, however, we ourselves lay the foundations of a 
conceptual, fictitious, and yet useful mirror of the reality we inhabit every day. We must 
take care, then, to build the “things” of the conceptual, strategic world in a way that pays 
homage to our own limited knowledge and to the potential of all actors to pursue their 
own existence in ways that may, to us, seem foreign, because the things we build into our 
strategic world will both enchain and empower the Strategos living at the center of that 
world—and, in turn, so our strategies will bind and guide us, for as much as we define 
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